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THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010:
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM
ROBERT F. RICH*
ERIC CHEUNG**
ROBERT LURVEY***
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark
decision in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius. 1 The case
focused on the constitutional challenges of twenty-six states to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) proposed by President Barack
Obama and passed by the United States Congress in 2010.2 This 5–4 decision is
widely viewed as one of the most important in history next to Bush v. Gore3 and
Brown v. the Board of Education.4 The decision is also very controversial and
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1. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
2. See id. at 2572 (noting that twenty-six states, along with the National Federation of Independent
Business, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate and Medicaid
expansion provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
3. See generally 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (determining the results of the 2000 election for President of
the United States).
4. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the doctrine of ―separate but equal‖ is unconstitutional
in public education); see, e.g., Kate Pickert, Supreme Court Upholds Health Reform Law in Landmark
Decision, TIME (June 28, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/06/28/supreme-court-upholdsobamacare-in-landmark-decision/?iid=sl-main-lede?iid=tsmodule (describing the Court‘s 5–4 holding as
a ―landmark‖ decision); Bobby Cuza, Supreme Court Upholds Obama Health Care Law, NY1.com
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ensured that health care reform was one of the most important and contested issues
in the 2012 national election. 5
What the status of health care reform is, and should be, is extraordinarily
divisive at the national and state levels in the United States.6 The Supreme Court
decision recognized that health care reform is centrally related to determining the
appropriate breadth and scope of involvement of the federal and state levels of
government in health care. 7 It also raised great uncertainty about the ultimate
implementation of PPACA with respect to some of the central provisions of the
legislation.8 Specifically, despite the Supreme Court decision, there continues to be
great controversy over implementation of the individual mandate and Medicaid
provisions of the legislation.9
The Supreme Court decision focused on several key issues which will be
central to this paper: (a) the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of
PPACA pursuant to the Commerce Clause; 10 (b) the constitutionality of the
individual mandate pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause; 11 (c) the ―tax‖ on
those who are not covered by health insurance; 12 and (d) the Medicaid expansion
provision.13
This paper argues that despite a focus on individual liberty by many opposing
individual mandates, the major controversies surrounding implementation will
focus on the appropriate scope and role of the federal and state governments in
(June 28, 2012), http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/163884/supreme-court-upholds-obama-healthcare-law (describing the case as a ―landmark decision‖).
5. See, e.g., Terry Baynes, “Friends” line up for Obamacare Supreme Court challenge, REUTERS
(Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/18/us-usa-supremecourt-friends-idUSBRE
82H09F20120318 (noting that a record-breaking one hundred and thirty-six amicus briefs were filed for
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius); see also Dan Balz, Introduction to WASH.
POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA‘S NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS
FOR US ALL 1, 4–6 (2010) [hereinafter LANDMARK] (tracing the origins of the health care debate to
Theodore Roosevelt‘s call for nationalized health insurance during his 1912 presidential bid, and noting
its omnipresence in public policy discussions ever since).
6. See Sarah Kliff, Gallup Poll: Health-Care Reform Now America's Most Divisive Issue,
NEWSWEEK, (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/thegaggle/2010/02/09/gallup-poll-health-care-reform-now-america-s-most-divisive-issue.html (describing
the current divide over health care reform).
7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
8. See generally Ten Strategic Considerations of the Supreme Court Upholding PPACA,
MILLIMAN (June 29, 2012), http://insight.milliman.com/article.php?cntid=8113 (highlighting various
uncertainties in PPACA‘s implementation and detailing ten strategic considerations that stakeholders
should focus on in preparing to implement provisions of the Act).
9. See generally id. (suggesting that the effectiveness of the individual mandate provision in
lowering costs will depend upon enrollee demographics and that questions still remain as to how
Medicaid expansion programs will function because the Court‘s ruling allows states to opt out).
10. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2584–87.
11. Id. at 2585.
12. Id. at 2580 (likening the Act‘s proposed penalty for individuals who do not purchase health
insurance to the IRS‘ assessment and collection of tax penalties).
13. Id. at 2581–82.
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providing health insurance and health care (the federalism dimension) along with
the questions of unfunded mandates, 14 Medicaid expansion,15 and the overall
financing of PPACA.16 The Court clearly wished to protect the states from coercion
by the federal government and wished to preserve individual autonomy for
citizens.17 To quote one District Court judge reviewing the legislation, the case of
PPACA ―is not really about our health care system at all. It is principally about our
federalist system, and it raises very important issues regarding the Constitutional
role of the federal government.‖18
Part II of this paper provides a general history of health care reform. Part III
of this paper discusses the various stages of implementing PPACA. Part IV
explores the major issues over the individual mandate covered by the Supreme
Court; we focus on the arguments put forward by the federal circuit courts and how
they were resolved (or not) by the landmark decision. Part V discusses
implementation issues surrounding Medicaid Expansion with a focus on
federalism. Part VI discusses direct challenges to federalism by the states against
the federal government over PPACA. Part VII concludes with an analysis of what
can be expected in the future. This paper will discuss the key implementation issues
of PPACA in the context of federalism.
II. HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE REFORM
The health care reform debate between 2008 and 2010, which led to the
passage of PPACA, was reminiscent of opportunities for reform that have occurred
on a cyclical basis throughout American history. These opportunities occurred most
notably in the presidential administrations of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman,
John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, and William J. Clinton. 19

14. See infra Parts IV.B.4, IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part VII.
17. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.,132 S. Ct. at 2578 (asserting that the Court tried to preserve the
individual autonomy preferred by the Framers by delegating specific powers to state governments in
certain areas).
18. Fla. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
19. See, e.g., Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care Reform and Social Movements in the United States, 93
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75, 7678 (2003) (reciting the various presidential attempts at health care reform,
including those by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Kennedy,
Lyndon Johnson, and Bill Clinton); see also Jerome Karabel, Obama, FDR, and the Politics of Health
Care Reform, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeromekarabel/obama-fdr-and-the-politic_b_234400.html (comparing the health care reform efforts of
Presidents Barack Obama and Franklin Roosevelt); Farah Stockman, Recalling the Nixon-Kennedy
Health Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, (June 23, 2012), available at http://articles.boston.com/2012-0623/opinion/32368604_1_health-care-health-insurance-stuart-altman (detailing the health care plans
proposed by President Nixon and his presumed Democratic rival Ted Kennedy in 1969).
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These debates were intense and controversial, but they did not ultimately lead to
legislation enacting health care reform.20
The Clinton Health Security Act, proposed in 1993, quickly became the
center of an intense public debate on ―reforming‖ the American health care
system.21 Both the Republican and Democratic parties proposed reform plans, and a
variety of states attempted to adopt more local health care reform efforts. 22 None of
the over one hundred proposals introduced in Congress between 1991 and 1994
was enacted.23 The major stakeholders in the American health care system—
providers, consumers, and third-party payers—could not agree on what needed to
be done.24 At the same time, the success of state reforms was very limited. 25 This
fact has led many journalists and scholars to conclude that the Clinton initiatives
were a ―colossal failure‖ which ultimately led to the Republican victory in the 1994
elections.26
This cycle seemed to end in 2010 with the passage of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (Health Care Act).27 President Obama has, to some
degree, succeeded where all of his predecessors failed, in that his healthcare
legislation passed.28 Nevertheless, there are a set of major implementation

20. See Derek Bok, The Great Health Care Debate of 1993-94, PUB. TALK: ONLINE J. DISCOURSE
LEADERSHIP (1998), http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/ptbok.html (discussing the nature of the health care
reform debate of 1993-1994 and the debate‘s failure to pass health care legislation).
21. See H. Richard Beresford, The Health Security Act: Coercion and Distrust for the Market, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1405 (1994) (discussing the debate over the health care reforms sparked by
Clinton‘s Health Security Act).
22. See Bok, supra note 20 (highlighting the competing plans for health reform during the 1994
election); see also Maggie Mertens, The Democrats’ 2010 Health Reform Plan Evokes 1993 Republican
Bill, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Checking-InWith/Durenberger-1993-gop-bill-q-and-a.aspx (comparing a bill proposed by Republicans in 1993 to
President Obama‘s health reform proposal).
23. See Bok, supra note 20 (explaining that during the 1993–94 congressional debates, twentyseven different legislative plans for health reform were proposed, none of which passed).
24. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 78 (noting that the lack of public input and general support and
the difficulty of pleasing both patients and health care providers contributed to the demise of Clinton‘s
proposal).
25
See Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health
Reform, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS 142, 143 (1994) (discussing the failure of states‘ attempts at health care
reform in 1993, due in part to ERISA preemption).
26. David Greenberg, It Wasn’t Harry and Louise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/03/23/reviews/970323.23greenbt.html. See also Charles Ornstein &
Sue Fox, Blazing a Trail for Health Care, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2003),
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/sep/15/local/me-health15 (noting that lawmakers have largely avoided
proposing health care reforms after the Clinton administration‘s failure to pass its reforms).
27. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PPACA].
28. See Jonathan Oberlander, Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform Finally Passed, 29 HEALTH
AFFS. 1112, 1112 (2010) (discussing failed attempts made by Presidents Truman, Nixon, Carter, and
Clinton to reform health care).
IN
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challenges and continued controversies that are associated with this legislation
despite the controversial Supreme Court decision.29 It is also worth noting that
ongoing controversy, over what to some is labeled ―Obamacare,‖ reflects the fact
that closure has not been reached on what constitutes appropriate or reasonable
health care reform and what the appropriate role of the federal government in the
organization and delivery of health care services should be.30 In this paper, we
argue that implementation needs to be viewed in the context of challenges
presented by historical and on-going discussions related to the ―appropriate role‖
for the federal and state levels of government in health care financing and delivery
(i.e., federalism).
III. STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION
PPACA was designed to address a series of key health insurance and health
care service delivery issues:31 (a) the growing number of adults and children who
are uninsured;32 (b) the inability of individuals with ―pre-existing conditions‖ to
obtain health insurance or affordable health insurance; 33 (c) the loss of health
insurance for those who contract a serious health condition; 34 (d) the affordability
of health insurance in general;35 and (e) the general lack of access to health
insurance for critical populations (e.g., children and the poor).36 Implementation of
the legislation occurs in four stages: (1) the first six months after the legislation was

29. See generally MILLIMAN, supra note 8(detailing various issues and challenges in implementing
PPACA which will need to be determined in the future).
30. See Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Upholds Obamacare: What It Means, What Happens Next,
FORBES (June 28, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/06/28/supreme-court-upholdshealthcare-law-what-it-means/ (suggesting possible future expectations and outcomes as a result of the
implementation of Obamacare and noting specifically the controversy surrounding state versus federal
funding for the expansion of Medicaid).
31. See HINDA CHAIKIND ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41664, PPACA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
OF THE LAW, IMPLEMENTATION, AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 1 (2011) (noting that PPACA was designed
to improve access to health insurance and enhance the quality of health care in the United States).
32. See Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010:
Reforming the Health Care Reform for the New Decade, 14 PAIN PHYSICIAN E35, E38 (2011) (stating
that in 2011 thirty-four million Americans were uninsured).
33. See id. at E39, E41 (illustrating that PPACA would bar insurance companies from denying
coverage to children with pre-existing conditions and would entirely eliminate pre-existing condition
limitations on insurance).
34. See id. at E41–42 (noting that PPACA‘s requirement that insurers renew policies ―without
regard to the health status of the insured‖ effectively prohibits companies from dropping people who
develop serious conditions).
35. See id. at E35, E38 (describing the new system of subsidies which will help make the new
health care system affordable based on income and family size).
36. See id. at E35, E37–38 (mentioning different provisions of PPACA that would provide the
thirty-four million Americans who were uninsured in 2011 access to health insurance, in part by
providing subsidies for the poor).
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enacted into law; (2) the period between 2011 and 2014; (3) 2014 thru 2019, (4)
and beyond 2019.37
From the perspective of consumers, some of the most attractive features of the
legislation have already been implemented or are currently in the process of
implementation:
 Insurance companies are required to provide health insurance for adult
dependent children up to age twenty-six on their parents‘ health insurance
policies;38
 Children with ―pre-existing conditions‖ cannot be denied health insurance
coverage;39
 Insurance plans are prohibited from rescinding coverage from individuals
(except in the case of fraud) and from placing lifetime limits on how much
can be paid out to individual policyholders; 40
 Insurance plans are required to cover preventative services for children,
such as immunizations, and women, such as cancer screenings; 41
 A temporary 5 billion dollar high-risk insurance pool will be established to
provide health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing medical
conditions who have been uninsured for at least six months;42
 A 5 billion dollar ―reinsurance program‖ will be established that allows
employers to provide insurance coverage for retirees over the age of fiftyfive who are not eligible for Medicare;43
 Small businesses with no more than twenty-five employees and average
annual wages of $40,000 will receive tax credits to help provide health
insurance to their employees. The tax credit is up to thirty-five percent of
the employer‘s contribution if the employer pays at least fifty percent of the
total premium cost (effective 2010 tax year with the credit increasing to
fifty percent in the 2014 tax year);44
 Medicare patients who face a gap in prescription drug coverage will receive
a one-time $250 rebate to help pay for medication; 45
 Funding will increase by 11 billion dollars for community health centers
which provide access to health care for many disadvantaged individuals
(effective January 1, 2011);46

37. See id. at E39–40 (showing the implementation schedule of PPACA, divided into categories
based on when specific provisions take effect).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14(a) (2010).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a) (2010).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2010).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13 (2011).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2011).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 18002 (2011).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 45R (2011).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–152c (2011).
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 A total annual fee of $2.5 billion will be imposed on pharmaceutical
manufacturers; this is designed to help finance the overall federal health
care program (effective January 1, 2011). The annual fee on pharmaceutical
manufacturers will increase to $3 billion each year through 2016 (effective
January 1, 2012);47
 Health insurance companies will be required to provide rebates to enrollees
if they spend less than eighty-five percent of premium dollars collected on
health care as opposed to administrative costs (effective January 1, 2011);48
 Primary care physicians and surgeons practicing in geographic areas that
lack primary care doctors will receive a ten percent bonus payment under
Medicare (effective January 1, 2011, through January 1, 2015); 49
 Drug companies will be required to provide a fifty percent discount on
brand-name prescription drugs for seniors who face a gap in drug coverage.
More discounts would be phased in through 2020 when the gap will be
closed (effective January 1, 2011).50 The annual fee on pharmaceutical
manufacturers will increase to $3.5 billion in 2017 and $4.2 billion in
2018;51
 The federal tax on individuals who spend money from health savings
accounts on ineligible medical expenses would be increased by twenty
percent (effective January 1, 2011);52
 Contributions to individual flexible savings accounts that set aside tax-free
money for health costs will be limited to $2,500; at the moment employers
set the limits (effective January 1, 2013);53
 The threshold for deducting itemized deductions for unreimbursed medical
expenses would be increased from 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income to
ten percent (effective January 1, 2013); and54

46. 42 U.S.C. § 254b–2 (2011).
47. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9008, 124 Stat. 119, 868
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–18 (2011) (requiring that large group plan insurers provide an eighty-five
percent rebate and that small group or individual plan insurers provide an 80 percent rebate).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l (2011).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–153 (2011); see also Medicare Drug Discounts, HEALTHCARE.GOV (last
updated July 6, 2012), http://www.healthcare.gov/law/features/65-older/drug-discounts/index.html
(providing a year-by-year breakdown of prescription drug discounts until the coverage gap is closed in
2020).
51. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9008, 124 Stat. 119, 868
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395t).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 223f (2011).
53. 26 U.S.C. § 125i (2011); Manchikanti, supra note 32, at E39.
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9013, 124 Stat. 119, 868
(2010) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 213).
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 The Medicare tax rate will increase by 0.9 percent—from 1.45 percent to
2.35 percent—on earnings over $200,000 for individuals and $250,000 for
families. (effective January 1, 2013).55
After this initial implementation phase, the most controversial aspects of the
Health Care Act are scheduled to be implemented in the period between 2014 and
2016.56 As of January 1, 2014, most Americans will be required to have health
insurance or pay a fine (or ―tax‖) which increases in amount between 2014 and
2019.57 Individuals with pre-existing medical conditions cannot be denied health
insurance coverage nor may their insurance be cancelled or not renewed due to
illness.58 In addition, other key controversial provisions are also scheduled for
implementation as of January 1, 2014 including:
 Expanding Medicaid, at the discretion of a state, by increasing income
eligibility to 133% percent of federal poverty level, or $29,327 for a family
of four. This is, in essence, an unfunded mandate on the states to increase
the number of individuals who qualify for Medicaid; 59
 Providing federal subsidies, which vary according to household income, to
offset the cost of purchasing health insurance for American citizens and
legal residents who qualify;60
 Imposing an annual fee of $8 billion on health insurance companies to help
finance the overall cost of the new health care program. The annual fee on
insurance companies increases to $13.9 billion in 2017 and $14.3 billion in
2019;61
 Creating state health insurance exchanges. These are new ―organizations‖
which are designed to provide affordable health insurance to a wide range
of individuals. These new organizations are designed to leverage insurance
companies with the result of providing more competitive prices; and 62
 Imposing a forty percent excise tax on health care plans that cost more than
$10,200 for individual coverage and $27,500 for family coverage (effective

55. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9015, 124 Stat. 119, 870-71
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152 §
1411, 124 Stat. 1029, 1061-63 (2010) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3101b).
56. See Martin D. Carrigan, The Patient Protection And Affordable Care Act of 2010:
Constitutional?, 3 AM. J. OF HEALTH SCI. 75, 76 (2012) (noting that the most controversial aspects of the
PPACA do not take effect until 2014).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2011).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 18001d (2011).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2011); Manchikanti, supra note 32, at E40.
60. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2011) (setting forth the premiums available by household income).
61. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9010, 124 Stat. 119, 865-88
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152 §
1406, 124 Stat. 1029, 1065-67 (2010); Manchikanti, supra note 32, at E40.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w–3 (2011).
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January 1, 2018). This is designed to constrain insurance companies from
making very large increases in insurance premiums. 63
As one can see, many of these implementation strategies postpone the
responsibility until further down the road. Those that are assigned to the states
carry immense regulatory and financial burdens. 64 Yet, while not trivial, these
implementation challenges were not unforeseen or unavoidable. 65 Indeed, the core
tenets driving PPACA‘s record pace from passage to the Supreme Court, the
individual mandate, were distinctly absent from candidate Obama‘s health care
proposals.66 As we proceed, the questions at issue are why this legislation in its
existing form and why now? Appreciating these answers will help address future
challenges to federalism in balancing state and federal power.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE: THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
As already noted, the two key issues which the Supreme Court examined in
reviewing PPACA were the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion. 67
Throughout the history of the litigation over these issues, the federal courts focused
on powers granted to the federal government under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Taxing Power.68 The core issue
for the Medicaid expansion was whether the federal government could mandate the

63. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I (2011).
64. See, e.g., Lanhee Chen, How Obamacare Burdens Already Strained State Budgets, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703326204575616824184501464.html
(discussing the financial strains the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will place on state
budgets); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, RULEMAKING
REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE PPACA 16 (2011) (asserting that the provisions of
PPACA are burdensome in the regulatory realm).
65. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State Challenges to the
Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 UNIV. OF RICHMOND L. REV. 781, 786–87 (2011) (predicting a
variety of state challenges to PPACA implementation).
66. See, e.g., President-Elect Barack Obama’s Health Care Reform Proposal, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/Obama_Health_Care_Reform_
Proposal.pdf (listing candidate Obama‘s health care proposal during the 2008 presidential campaign
which did not include an individual mandate provision); Andrew Cline, How Obama Broke His Promise
on Individual Mandates, ATLANTIC, June 29, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/
06/how-obama-broke-his-promise-on-individual-mandates/259183/ (discussing the lack of an individual
mandate in Obama‘s original health care plan proposal in 2008).
67. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
68. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 886 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(discussing whether Congress acted Constitutionally in passing the individual mandate provision of the
PPACA); Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 611, 629–30 (W.D. Va. 2010) (examining
whether Congress exceeded its powers by forcing individuals to purchase health insurance); Florida v.
U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the
appropriateness of the individual mandate under the Constitution‘s Commerce Clause and Necessary
and Proper Clause).
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Medicaid expansion.69 The Supreme Court settled the debate by stating that the
individual mandate was constitutional pursuant to Congress‘s Taxing Power and
that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional because it violated Congress‘s
taxing and spending power. 70 The Court noted that it was improper for the federal
government to ―coerce‖ the States.71
Part A will briefly review the Supreme Court‘s decision in National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius. Part B will discuss the
Commerce Clause‘s application to the individual mandate. Part C will discuss the
Necessary and Proper Clause‘s application to the individual mandate. Part D will
discuss the Taxing and Spending Clause‘s application to the individual mandate.
Part E will discuss the implementation issues associated with the Medicaid
expansion. Part F will discuss cases where states directly challenged the limits of
federalism when they passed their own state laws that protected their citizens from
being mandated to purchase insurance. Part G details closing thoughts and remarks.
A. The Supreme Court’s Holding on the Constitutionality of PPACA.
The Supreme Court ruled that PPACA‘s ―individual mandate‖ provision is
constitutional due to Congress‘s Taxing Power. 72 The Supreme Court looked at
four major issues pertaining to PPACA: (1) whether the Court‘s jurisdiction is
removed by the Anti-Injunction Act;73 (2) if the Court does have jurisdiction,
whether the insurance mandate falls within the Commerce Clause or Taxing
Powers of Congress;74 (3) if the insurance mandate is deemed unconstitutional,
whether it is severable from the rest of PPACA; 75 and (4) the constitutionality of
the mandated Medicaid expansion.76
1. The Anti-Injunction Act
The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) provides ―no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court
by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.‖77 Barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes

69. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (noting that plaintiffs challenged the
Medicaid expansion provision on the basis that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers in
expanding Medicaid).
70. Id. at 2608.
71. Id. at 2602.
72. Id. at 2600.
73. Id. at 2582–84.
74. Id. at 2594–601.
75. Id. at 2607.
76. Id. at 2603–08.
77. Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2011).

2013]

PPACA: IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM

87

―protects the Government‘s ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue.‖ 78 The
issue was whether the AIA barred litigation on PPACA‘s individual mandate. 79
Prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision, a holding that the AIA barred litigation
would presumably have required that PPACA‘s individual mandate be considered a
tax.80 However, even though the Supreme Court found the mandate to be
constitutional pursuant to Congress‘s Taxing Power, 81 the holding concerning the
AIA stated that the individual mandate did not preclude litigation on the Individual
Mandate Exaction because it was not a tax for the purposes of the AIA. 82 The
seeming inconsistency of the application of the AIA and the Taxing Power will be
discussed in detail later.83
2. The Interstate Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power ―to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.‖84 The issue regarding the constitutionality of the individual
mandate was whether the individual mandate was outside the scope of Congress‘s
Commerce Clause Power.85 In a 5–4 vote, the majority of the Supreme Court
Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Alito, found that the individual mandate was outside the scope
of Congress‘s Commerce Power.86 Justice Ginsburg‘s partially concurring and
partially dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Kagan, found that the individual mandate was within Congress‘s Commerce
Clause Power.87
The Commerce Clause Power was hotly contested as the main issue prior to
the Supreme Court decision.88 The proper exertion of Congress‘s Power over the

78. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (discussing the purpose of the Anti-Injunction
Act).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 415 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that mandates are constitutional taxes because the AIA barred litigation against
them), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
81. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
82. Id. at 2584.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 381–93.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
85. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (reiterating the government‘s argument that the
individual mandate is a valid use of Congress‘s Commerce Clause power).
86. Id. at 2591.
87. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See infra Part IV.B.1–B.5.
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states and the American Public continues to be a major source of political debate. 89
A further discussion of these implications will be discussed later in this paper. 90
3. The Taxing Power
The Taxing Power provides that ―Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.‖91 The issue facing the
Supreme Court was whether the individual mandate is a tax for the purposes of
Congress‘s Taxing Power.92 Interestingly enough, as stated above, the Court‘s
majority found that it was a tax pursuant to Congress‘s Taxing Power, even though
it was not considered a tax for the purposes of the AIA. 93 This holding allowed the
individual mandate to be constitutionally valid under Congress‘s Taxing Power. 94
There was a lot of controversy over this decision.95 Prior to the Supreme
Court‘s decision, only one circuit court considered the individual mandate to be a
tax.96 Other federal circuit courts or district courts either found that it was not a tax
or did not decide on that issue.97 Furthermore, even proponents of PPACA did not

89. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (discussing the historical
tension of balancing of state power with Congressional power through federalism).
90. See infra Part III.B.1–B.5.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
92. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2584 (reiterating the government‘s argument that the
individual mandate is a valid use of Congress‘s Taxing Power).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Chris Good, Obama in 2009: The Individual Mandate is Not a Tax, ABC NEWS (June
28, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/obama-in-2009-its-not-a-tax/
(noting that the Court‘s decision was particularly controversial because President Obama had previously
stated that the individual mandate is not a tax, although the Court found otherwise).
96. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 413–15 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
individual mandate was a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty
Univ. v. Geithner, No. 11-438 (U.S. June 29, 2012); see also id. at 423 (Davis, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating that prior to this case no other court has held that the Anti-Injunction Act is applicable to
the individual mandate).
97. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
mandate is valid on other grounds and declining to rule on whether it is a tax), cert. denied, 2012 WL
2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012); Fla. ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 1235, 1328
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the mandate is not a tax), cert. granted in part sub nom. Fla. v. Dep‘t of
Health and Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 895 (E.D.
Mich. 2010) (holding that the mandate is valid on other grounds and declining to rule on whether it is a
tax), aff’d, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012); Fla. ex
rel. Bondi v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1265 n.4 (N.D. Fla.) (rejecting the
Department‘s argument that the mandate is a tax), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Fla. ex rel. Att‘y
Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir.), cert. granted in part sub
nom. Fla. v. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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consider it a tax, including President Obama himself. 98 Thus, this decision greatly
changes several fundamental dynamics of PPACA and federalism, which are
further discussed below.99
4. Medicaid Expansion
The Medicaid expansion was created pursuant to Congress‘s Taxing and
Spending Power, which comes from the same clause as the Taxing Power. 100 The
issue was whether the Medicaid expansion is so coercive that it is a violation of
Congress‘s Taxing and Spending Power. 101 The Supreme Court, in a 7–2 vote,
found that it was too coercive and struck down a key component of PPACA‘s
overall attempt to provide universal health care. 102 Three Justices, Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan, found that the Medicaid expansion
could survive as long as the federal government could not threaten to remove all of
its existing funding if States did not participate. 103 Four Justices, consisting of
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, would have eliminated the Medicaid
expansion altogether.104 The Supreme Court drew a line on what is deemed
―coercive,‖ implying that a limit exists on Congress‘s future ability to incentivize
states with its spending power.105 This has great implications on the future of
federalism, which will be discussed below. 106
5. Prior History
Prior to the Supreme Court‘s Ruling, the federal district and circuit courts
were split, bitterly dividing by party lines.107 The following chart is a summary of
holdings of the Supreme Court cases, the circuit court Cases, and the district court
cases that were successfully appealed:

98. Good, supra note 95.
99. See infra Part IV.D (examining the mandate as a tax and its broad implications on federalism).
100. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601.
101. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (explaining the plaintiffs‘ stance that the
Medicaid expansion exceeds Congress‘s power under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the
Constitution).
102. Id. at 2606–08; id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that seven members of the Court
agreed that the expansion of Medicaid ―as enacted by Congress‖ was unconstitutional).
103. Id. at 2607 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 2667–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2602–03 (majority opinion).
106. See infra Part V.
107. See infra Tables 1 and 2.
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TABLE 1
SUPREME COURT AND CIRCUIT COURT CASES:

Constitutionality of Individual Mandate
Case Name

Court

Commerce Clause/
Necessary &

Constitutionality
of the Medicaid

Taxing Power

Expansion

No108

Yes109

No110

6th Circuit

Yes111

Not Discussed112

Not argued113

11th Circuit

No114

No115

Yes116

4th Circuit

Not discussed117

Proper
National
Federation of
Independent
Business v.

Supreme
Court

Sebelius
Thomas More
Law Center v.
Obama
Florida v.
HHS
Liberty
University v.

Yes; but noted that

Geithner
Virginia v.
Sebelius

AIA precludes

Not Discussed

adjudication118
4th Circuit

Virginia lacks standing to adjudicate against PPACA since its only
injury is based on the VHCFA. 119

108. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591, 2593.
109. Id. at 2584.
110. Id. at 2606–08.
111. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL
2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 534 (stating that the court will consider only the constitutionality of the individual
mandate provision).
114. Fla. ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir.),
cert. granted in part sub nom. Fla. v. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011), and
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 397, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2011) (demonstrating
that the issue in the case was only whether the individual mandate was an unlawful tax), cert. denied,
sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
118. Id. at 414–15.
119. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012
WL 2470098 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
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TABLE 2
DISTRICT COURT CASES:
Constitutionality of Individual Mandate
Case Name

Court

Commerce Clause/
Necessary &

Taxing Power

Proper
Thomas More
Law Center v.
Obama
Florida v.
HHS

Expansion

Yes120

Not Discussed121

Not Discussed122

No123

Not Discussed124

Yes125

Michigan
Northern
District of
Florida
Western

University v.

District of

Geithner

Virginia

Sebelius

of the Medicaid

Eastern
District of

Liberty

Virginia v.

Constitutionality

No; also noted that
Yes126

AIA does not
preclude

Not Discussed

Adjudication127

Eastern
District of

No128

No129

Not Discussed130

Virginia

120. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 895–96 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651
F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
121. Id. at 895.
122. See id. at 885–86 (stating that the issues of the case were limited to whether Congress lacks
power under the Commerce Clause to pass health care reform, whether the mandate provision is an
unconstitutional tax, and whether the Act violates the Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause,
Due Process Clause or states‘ rights under the Tenth Amendment).
123. Fla. ex. rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1298–99
(N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Fla. ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir.), cert. granted in part sub nom. Fla. v. Dep‘t of Health and
Human Servs., 132 S.Ct. 604 (2011), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566
(2012).
124. See id. at 1306–07 (holding that the individual mandate violates the Commerce Clause but
omitting discussion of whether the mandate is a lawful exercise of Congress‘s taxing power).
125. Id. at 1269.
126. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 611, 630 (W.D. Va. 2010) (upholding the
mandate as a valid exercise of Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause, and providing that a
Necessary and Proper Clause assessment of the provision was not necessary to the court‘s analysis),
vacated, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL
2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
127. Id. at 627–29.
128. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470098 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
129. Id. at 787.
130. See id. at 770 (noting that the issue was specifically the constitutionality of the individual
mandate and omitting any discussion Medicaid expansion).
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6. Implications on Federalism
The Supreme Court‘s landmark decision has significant implications for the
structure and operations of federalism. 131 The Supreme Court‘s decision is final as
far as the judicial branch of government is concerned. 132 However, there has
already been much discussion on possibly repealing PPACA through the legislative
branch.133 The battle over PPACA actually signals a much broader struggle than
just that of the financing and delivery of health care across the country; it deals
with the best way to define the powers of our dual system of government. 134 Who
should have the regulatory powers over the design and delivery of health care in the
United States—the state government or the federal government? What are the
policy issues that should be taken into consideration? These questions can be
answered by looking into the various issues presented by PPACA debate with a
focus on its federalism dimension.135
B. The Individual Mandate: The Interstate Commerce Clause
The most controversial implementation issue in PPACA is § 1501, ―Minimum
Essential Coverage Provision,‖ also known as the individual mandate. 136 As already
noted, this section is effective on January 1, 2014 and requires that each ―applicable
individual‖ purchase health insurance or be subject to a ―penalty‖ or tax. 137 The
definition of ―applicable individual‖ is ―an individual other than‖ a religious
objector who opposes health insurance in principle, a non-resident or illegal
resident, or an incarcerated individual. 138 Therefore, outside of the few above

131. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 257780 (discussing the importance of federalism
and its impact on the Court‘s decision).
132. U.S. CONST. art III; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–79 (1803) (establishing the
principle of judicial review and noting the power of the Supreme Court in the judicial branch).
133. See, e.g., Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, H.R. 2, 112th Cong. (2011)
(providing for the repeal of the PPACA); Press Release, Rep. Steny Hoyer, Minority Whip, Republicans
Try To Repeal Health Care Benefits, Still No Focus On Jobs Or Economy (Jul. 11, 2012),
http://hoyer.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3003&Itemid=56.
134. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577 (examining the power of Congress to enact a law
that many States and individuals believe exceed the federal government‘s authority).
135. See infra Part VI.
136. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.Supp.2d 1120,
1127–28, 1142 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that the individual mandate was ―by far the most publicized and
controversial part‖ of the Act ); Gayland O. Hethcoat II, Plaintiff Standing in Florida ex rel. Bondi and
the Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1241,
1243,1245–48 (2011) (describing the individual mandate as ―[t]he Act's most controversial provision‖
due to the constitutional debate over whether Congress had the power to enact such a mandate); Leslie
Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J.
1117, 1128, 1154 (2012) (stating that there is ―sharp disagreement‖ about the ―controversial individualmandate provision‖ and whether or not it ―regulates economic activity‖).
137. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2011).
138. § 5000A(d).
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mentioned exceptions, the ―individual mandate‖ of PPACA applies to everyone
living in the United States.139
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the individual mandate is
Constitutional, pursuant to Congress‘s Taxing Power. 140 However, a discussion of
the debate over the many and varied issues is important to understand the
implications of the Supreme Court‘s ruling on federalism.
At the inception of PPACA, in the Congressional findings associated with
passage of the law, Congress found that the individual mandate is commercial and
economic in nature and substantially affects interstate commerce because (1) the
requirement related to (a) an activity (b) which is commercial, the decision to
purchase health care and health insurance, (2) health care and health insurance are
substantial parts of the national economy, (3) the act will increase the number of
people insured and ―add millions of new consumers to the health insurance
market,‖ (4) the universal coverage will strengthen the private insurance market,
(5) the act will improve financial security of families, (6) under ERISA and the
Public Health Service Act the Federal government already has a significant role in
regulating the insurance market of interstate commerce, (7) the Act will decrease
adverse selection, and (8) the act will increase economies of scale. 141
Once an act of Congress falls under the Commerce Clause, it can be executed
under the Necessary and Proper Clause; ―The Congress shall have Power [t]o make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers.‖142 The main implementation issue at the time was whether
Congress acted within its powers granted by the Constitution. 143
Congress concluded that the individual mandate ―is essential to creating
effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products
that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions
can be sold.‖144
All cases discussing the constitutionality of PPACA, to date, have focused on
the constitutionality of the law‘s ―mandate‖ to purchase individual insurance. 145
139. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (―The individual mandate requires most
Americans to maintain ‗minimum essential‘ health insurance coverage.‖).
140. Id. at 2600.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2011).
142. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
143. See, e.g., Robert R. Harrison, Health Care Reform in the Federal Courts, 57 FED. LAW. 52, 52
(2010) (noting that several states including Virginia and Florida quickly filed lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the PPACA); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Nationalizing Health Care Reform in A
Federalist System, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1245, 1247 (2011) (stating that many of the challenges to health
care reform concern federalism issues and whether the federal government exceeded its powers by
mandating state participation in the Act‘s implementation).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2011).
145. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 54041, 549 (6th Cir. 2011)
(discussing the constitutionality of the individual mandate and holding that Congress acted within its
Commerce Clause powers in enacting the provision), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29,
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The main challenge is the authority of Congress to compel everyone (with some
exceptions) to purchase health insurance. 146 Several key issues to answer this
question deal with (1) the Commerce Clause Power and its precedent; (2) the
relevant market the individual mandate is regulating; (3) whether the individual
mandate regulates activity or inactivity; (4) the uniqueness of the healthcare
market; and (5) possible alternative approaches if the current jurisprudence of the
Commerce Clause is unhelpful.147
1. The Commerce Clause Power and Landmark Precedent
The most controversial issue regarding the individual mandate is whether it is
within Congress‘s Commerce power to require individuals to purchase insurance. 148
The Commerce Clause states that Congress has the power ―[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.‖ 149
United States v. Lopez identified three broad categories that Congress could
regulate under the Commerce Clause Power: (1) the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect or substantially
relate to interstate commerce.150 The debate is whether the individual mandate falls
under the third category of the commerce clause power. 151 Wickard v. Filburn
established the ―substantial effects doctrine‖ which allows Congress to regulate an
individual‘s economic activity if, in the aggregate, that activity done by many

2012); Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1268, 1311,
131314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing the constitutionality of the individual mandate as a invalid
exercise of Congress‘ power under the Commerce Clause and the Taxing Power), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Liberty Univ., Inc. v.
Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 611, 635 (W.D. Va. 2010) (discussing the constitutionality of the individual
mandate under the Commerce Clause and holding that Congress acted within its powers in enacting the
provision), vacated, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner,
2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
146. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 139, 142 (2011)
(―The only portion of the Act's constitutionality that seems to be in serious question is the individual
mandate.‖).
147. See infra Part IV.B.
148. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3.
150. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 55859 (1995).
151. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 1585–86 (noting the Government‘s argument
that the mandate falls under Congress‘s power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on
commerce). See also Bruce Moyer, State Actions Against Health Care Law Take Root, 57 FED. LAW. 8,
8 (2010) (discussing the controversy surrounding the mandate and whether its enactment is a valid
exercise of Congress‘s power to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce); Arthur
Nussbaum, Can Congress Make You Buy Health Insurance? The Affordable Care Act, National Health
Care Reform, and the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 411, 416 (2012)
(noting Congress‘s finding that that the individual mandate is of a commercial and economic nature and
―substantially affects interstate commerce‖).
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individuals would have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. 152
How this doctrine applies to the individual mandate has been greatly debated. 153
There are several issues central to determining how the individual mandates are
affected by the Commerce Clause. These issues include: whether not purchasing
insurance is considered activity or inactivity, whether the decision not to purchase
insurance is an economic decision, and whether the insurance or the healthcare
market is being regulated by the mandate. 154
Lopez and United States v. Morrison provide a limit to the commerce clause
power and the substantial effects doctrine. In Lopez, the Gun-Free School Zone Act
was considered to be criminal in nature, not economic, and therefore outside the
scope of the three broad categories of the commerce clause. 155 In Morrison, the
Violence Against Women Act was deemed to be outside of Congress‘s commerce
power because the relationship of violence against women to commerce would
require a ―but-for causal chain‖ of reasoning and would require inference upon
inference to establish.156 There would be no stopping point as Congress could
exercise police powers traditionally reposed to the States. 157 Lopez and Morrison
drive the debate over the mandate toward whether or not it is an economic activity
and whether it requires ―inference upon inference‖ to establish the non-purchase of
health insurance to constitute ―commerce.‖ 158
However, given the limitations afforded in Lopez and Morrison, Gonzales v.
Raich expands the commerce powers, allowing Congress to regulate a wholly
intrastate activity that is not itself commercial if failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut a broader regulatory scheme. 159 Thus, if the decision to not
purchase insurance is deemed to be part of a greater regulatory scheme for PPACA
to enforce its other provisions, it will be within Congress‘s powers. 160
The core tension regarding the law‘s constitutionality involves Wickard and
Raich’s expansion of the commerce clause and Lopez and Morrison’s limitation of
it.161 Those that find the mandate constitutional emphasize Wickard and Raich.162

152. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942).
153. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Parts IV.B.23.
155. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 567.
156. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
157. Id. at 615–16.
158. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2623–24 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (applying the Court‘s reasoning in Lopez and Morrison in determining whether buying
health insurance is an economic act).
159. 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
160. Id. (reasoning that Congress was acting within its Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper
Clause powers in enacting regulations banning the use of medicinal marijuana because the ban was part
of a larger regulatory scheme). See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 151–159.
162. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2616, 2619, 262126 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (discussing Wickard and Raich extensively and concluding that the individual mandate
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Those that find the mandate unconstitutional seek to apply the limiting
jurisprudence of Lopez and Morrison.163 Some Courts have found the current
jurisprudence to be unworkable and have fallen back to fundamental principles of
federalism for guidance.164 The varied approaches of the district courts and courts
of appeal will be discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this section.
2. Economic: Regulating Health Care Industry or Health Insurance Market?
One important factor to determine if Congress acted within its Commerce
Clause Power is whether the regulated activity is an economic one (a commercial
activity).165 For the individual mandate, a key issue in addressing this question is
whether the Minimum Essential Coverage Clause is designed to regulate the
―insurance‖ market or the ―health care‖ market. 166 If it regulates insurance, then it
would be regulating the decision to not purchase insurance, arguably a noneconomic decision.167 The mandate would be forcing people into a market in which
they were previously not a participant.168 If, on the other hand, the mandate

should be upheld under the substantial effects doctrine of the Commerce Clause); Thomas More Law
Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 54260 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing the similarities between the laws
upheld in Wickard and Raich and PPACA‘s individual mandate), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S.
June 29, 2012); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010) (stating that
the substantial effects doctrine under Raich and Wickard apply in determining whether the individual
mandate is a constitutional exercise of Congress‘s Commerce Clause power), vacated, 671 F.3d 391 (4th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
163. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578, 2646 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that Lopez and Morrison indicate that there are limits to Congress‘ Commerce power and
concluding that the individual mandate cannot be upheld under Congress‘ Commerce power); Florida ex
rel. Atty. Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 127376, 131213 (11th Cir. 2011)
(discussing Lopez and Morrison extensively and ultimately concluding that Congress exceeded its
Commerce powers in enacting the individual mandate), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
164. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1284 (stating that, in order to determine
whether an act of Congress has violated the Commerce Clause, the Court must look at the action‘s effect
on federalism).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (noting that the challenged statute
did not regulate economic activity and therefore was not a valid exercise of Congress‘s Commerce
Clause powers).
166. See infra Part IV.B.2. See also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780
F.Supp.2d 1256, 1288 n.18 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (acknowledging the plaintiff‘s opinion that Congress is
attempting to regulate the more narrow health insurance market rather than the health care market)
(emphasis added), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
167. See JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40725, REQUIRING
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 6 (2009) (stating that
while regulating the health care market could be economic activity, regulating the choice whether to
purchase insurance is arguably not economic activity).
168. In fact, this is the contention of the Supreme Court‘s majority opinion. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (―The individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely because
they elected to refrain from commercial activity.‖).
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regulates the health care market as a whole, the mandate would be regulating the
active participation in the health care market since virtually everyone makes use of
this market.169 This would be economic participation that is within Congress‘s
commerce power.170
All courts agree that everyone will likely enter the ―health care‖ market at
some point, and therefore it is not a question of whether one will participate, but
when and under what terms.171 Judge Vinson of the Northern District of Florida, as
the first district court to deem the mandate unconstitutional, sided with the
plaintiffs in holding that the relevant market ―for the purposes of analyzing the
individual mandate is the more specific health insurance market‖ and not the
broadly defined ―health care‖ market. 172 The Eleventh Circuit, for the appellate
case, frequently framed the mandate as one that regulates the decision of ―choosing
not to purchase health insurance.‖173
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit framed the relevant market as the health care
market, stating that ―[t]he Act considered as a whole makes clear that Congress was
concerned that individuals maintain minimum coverage not as an end in itself, but
because of the economic implications on the broader health care market‖ and
finding the mandate to be constitutional. 174 The 6th Circuit also stated that
―[c]onsumption of health care falls squarely within Raich’s definition of
economics, and virtually every individual in this country consumes these
services.‖175 The term ―these services‖ refers to the ―broader health care market.‖ 176

169. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544–49 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that Congress
may enact legislation requiring individuals to purchase health insurance even if the legislation is
regulating inactivity because participation and lack of participation affect the health care market), cert.
denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
170. See, e.g., id. at 544 (stating that the decision to buy health insurance as well as the decision not
to buy health insurance are both economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce).
171. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (demonstrating that the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions agree with this fact and illustrating that it has not been a point of
contention in the debate on health care reform).
172. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1288 n.18 (N.D.
Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
173. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1286 (emphasizing that individuals who choose not to
purchase insurance are not involved in economic activity and therefore not regulated parties subject to
Congress‘s Commerce Clause powers); id. at 1292 (declining to limit its analysis solely to the decision
not to purchase health insurance); id. at 1297 (discussing the slippery slope that would result in allowing
Congress to compel purchases of products or services by individuals who have purposely chosen not to
purchase them); id. at 1310 (stating that the regulated conduct—the decision whether to purchase health
insurance—does not frustrate Congressional efforts to regulate the insurance industry as a whole).
174. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 543–44.
175. Id. at 544.
176. See id. at 543 (noting that almost everyone is a participant in the health care market and such
individuals must finance ―these services‖ either by buying health insurance or by self-insuring).
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Interestingly, the dissenting Fourth Circuit Judge in Liberty v. Geithner
analyzed whether the Commerce Clause can apply to the decision not to purchase
health insurance but still found the individual mandate to be constitutional. 177
However, in order to allow the Commerce Clause to apply to the health insurance
market, Judge Davis had to make two arguments. The first argument is that the
health insurance market has not ―always been the province of the states‖ like
―education, family law, and criminal law.‖178 The second argument is that the
mandate does not compel action in an unconstitutional way because Congress has
compelled purchases in the past.179 However, Judge Davis found that there would
be a problem if Congress compelled consumption. 180 He reasoned that since
everyone enters the health care market, they are consuming health care services. 181
Congress is only requiring them to pay their fair share for such services. 182
Therefore, even though the analysis was geared toward the health insurance
market, the critical link to find the mandate constitutional was the finding that
people, by virtue of being alive, are participating in the health care market as a
whole and Congress may mandate purchases of health insurance. 183
The Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the relevant market went one step
further from commercial activity when they deemed the individual mandate to be
outside of Congress‘s Commerce Clause Power. 184 In the majority opinion, Justice
Roberts stated that ―[t]he individual mandate‘s regulation of the uninsured as a
class is, in fact, particularly divorced from any link to existing commercial
activity.‖185 This single sentence in the entire opinion demonstrates that the
majority deemed insurance to be at issue in the individual mandate. The fact that it
was the uninsured people as a class instead of the health insurance market as a
whole simply bolsters the argument that the individual mandate is far removed

177. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 441 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
178. Id. at 438 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)).
179. Id. at 446 (citing examples of two federal laws that have required purchases in the past: the
Motor Carrier Act, 49 C.F.R. § 387 (2012), which requires all drivers purchase car insurance, and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75
(2011), which requires owners of property containing hazardous substances to provide remediation
measures).
180. Id. at 448.
181. See id. at 447 (stating that ―public goods are enjoyed by all‖ and that ―lower prices for health
services‖ is a public good).
182. See id. at 446 (recognizing that the individual mandate requires individuals to purchase health
insurance or pay a penalty to the government to offset the government‘s costs for providing care to the
uninsured).
183. See id. (arguing that framing the individual mandate as unlawfully requiring participation in the
health care market does not make the provision unconstitutional because such Congressional compulsion
has long been held to be a valid exercise of Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause).
184. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590 (2012).
185. Id.
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from what is considered commercial activity. 186 Thus, the opinion avoids the
problem of trying to distinguish between regulation of the health insurance market
and regulation of the health care market.187 However, it still demonstrates that the
relevant market of regulation is integral to the ultimate decision on whether the
individual mandate is within Congress‘s Commerce Clause Power.188
The particular issue of the relevant market is not an issue that is directly
debated even though it is important in determining whether the individual mandate
regulates economic activity.189 The most likely reason is that the broader health
care market includes the health insurance market and the health insurance market
is an integral part of how individuals acquire health care services. 190 The two
markets are so integrated with each other that it is easy to interchange and confuse
one with the other.191
The debate over whether PPACA applies to health insurance versus health
care is not merely semantic. It lies at the heart of our dual system of government. 192
If the bill is meant to affect the health care market then, arguably, it is a national

186. Id.
187. Compare id. (focusing the discussion on whether the individual mandate regulates the
uninsured as a class that is wholly inactive in commerce, rather than determining the mandate‘s relevant
market of regulation), with Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d
1256, 1288 n.18 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (noting plaintiff‘s opinion that the individual mandate provision is
Congress‘s attempt to regulate the more narrow health insurance market rather than the health care
market) (emphasis added), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l
Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
188. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (focusing on the commercial inactivity of the
uninsured as a class, which necessarily entails defining the relevant market of regulation by the
individual mandate).
189. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Lower court cases that discuss the constitutionality
of PPACA do not devote a section to discussing what the relevant market is. See, e.g., Thomas More
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011) (lacking a discussion of the relevant market of
regulation and instead focusing on the class of individuals regulated), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097
(U.S. June 29, 2012); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 414–15 (4th Cir. 2011) (failing to
include any substantive determination of whether the regulated market is health care or health insurance
in the context of Congress‘s commerce power and instead deciding the issue using the taxing and
spending power), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29,
2012).
190. See Les Christie, Number of people without health insurance climbs, CNNMONEY, Sept. 13,
2011,
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/13/news/economy/census_bureau_health_insurance/index.htm
(providing that in 2010 approximately sixteen percent of the population was uninsured and illustrating
that the majority of Americans were insured).
191. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 41, Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398) (―Congress understood the economic reality that health insurance and health care
financing are inherently integrated, and it was permitted to regulate on that basis.‖).
192. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2589 (finding that if the individual mandate
was upheld under the Commerce Clause it would allow Congress to regulate inactivity, which would
change the dynamics of the federal government-citizen relationship).
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problem that is being solved with a federal solution. 193 If the bill is meant to affect
the health insurance market, then the question arises whether it should fall solely
under state regulation.194 There is no doubt that PPACA directly affects health
insurance companies through various restrictions. 195 The main method by which
PPACA seeks to provide universal health care is through the health insurance
market.196 The question then boils down to whether a regulation on the insurance
market can be seen as a regulation on the broader health care market. 197
PPACA was Congress‘s solution to the rising cost of health care. 198 Even
though the approach specifically deals with insurance companies, the goals are
much broader than just the health insurance market. 199 The fact that PPACA relies
heavily on regulating insurance companies and policy-holders reflects how integral
the health insurance market is to the overall health care market.200 However,
determination of the specific market PPACA seeks to regulate is not decisive on
whether the individual mandate falls within Congress‘s commerce power because
the current debate has not been framed along the lines of health care versus health
insurance.201 Instead, the major area of disagreement lies in whether the act of not
purchasing health insurance constitutes an economic activity. 202 More specifically,
framers of the debate have asked the broader question of whether or not purchasing

193. See id. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that when a ―national solution‖ is required,
Congress may take over an otherwise private market and establish a ―tax-and-spend federal program‖ to
address the issue, as it did with the creation of the Social Security program).
194. See id. at 2649–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the individual mandate is not within
Congress‘s enumerated constitutional powers). Granting states the exclusive power to regulate health
insurance is one of the primary purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which exempts the insurance
industry from most federal regulation. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2011).
195. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2011) (imposing regulations on the portability of, access to, and
reliability of health insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2011) (preserving the right of insurance customers to
maintain existing coverage at the time of PPACA‘s enactment); 42 U.S.C § 18022 (2011) (requiring
certain minimum levels of coverage for insurance plans); 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2011) (requiring insurance
companies to provide coverage for individuals with preexisting conditions).
196. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2011) (requiring individuals to maintain minimum levels of insurance
coverage or pay a penalty tax); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2011) (outlining for states certain specific
requirements for Medicaid insurance plans); 42 U.S.C. 1396d(y)(1) (2011) (outlining decreasing
amounts of federal assistance to state Medicaid plans for newly eligible persons); 42 U.S.C. § 18031
(2011) (providing for the establishment of health benefit exchanges in each state).
197. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (finding it to be well settled that Congress
may regulate an economic activity that is integral and necessary to a larger regulatory scheme).
198. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief for Respondents at 2, Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 and 11-400).
199. The Act does not simply regulate health insurance; it also regulates other aspects of health care
as a whole. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2011) (extending Medicaid eligibility); 42 U.S.C. §§ 280j
(2011) (improving the quality and efficiency of health care); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2011) (regulating and
improving access to certain biological products).
200. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 166, 187–189 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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insurance constitutes ―inactivity‖ and whether ―inactivity‖ automatically falls
outside the category of ―economic activity.‖ 203
3. Activity versus Inactivity as a Limiting Principle
The major issue that has been debated by the Supreme Court, Courts of
Appeal, and District Courts is whether the individual mandate regulates activity or
inactivity and whether such a distinction is constitutionally relevant. 204 Some
plaintiffs argued that forcing them to purchase something they do not want to
purchase (or feel that they do not need), whether they can afford to or not, is an
unconstitutional overreaching of the authority of the federal government. 205 It was
the plaintiffs‘ position that if PPACA is found constitutional, the Commerce Clause
would provide Congress with the authority to regulate every aspect of our lives,
including our choice to refrain from acting. 206 The federal government, on the other
hand, contended that everyone eventually enters the health care market, 207 and thus
Congress is not infringing on people‘s liberty because everyone inevitably uses
health services.208 All of the cases have noted that the activity/inactivity issue is
unprecedented and represents an important new dimension of constitutional
interpretation of the commerce clause. 209

203. See infra Part IV.B.3.
204. See, e.g., Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (stating that the
individual mandate regulates inactivity by forcing individuals to ―become active‖); Thomas More Law
Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 543 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing the plaintiffs‘ concession that while the
decision not to purchase health insurance may be an activity, this class of activities is beyond Congress‘
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012);
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 422 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting) (describing the
plaintiffs‘ position that the decision not to purchase health insurance is inactivity and regulation under
Congress‘ Commerce Power), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099
(U.S. June 29, 2012); Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1291–92 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the individual mandate forces individuals who choose not to
purchase health insurance into active participation in the health insurance market), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
205. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1270 (N.D.
Fla. 2011) (addressing plaintiffs‘ claim that the federal government‘s requiring individuals to purchase
health insurance is beyond of the power of the Commerce Clause because it focuses on economic
activity rather than inactivity), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l
Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
206. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d
529 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
207. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585.
208. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F.Supp.2d at 1288 (discussing the government‘s argument that every
human is vulnerable to sickness or injury at any time and thus cannot choose to remain outside of the
health care market).
209. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599; Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 558–59;
Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 448 (Davis, J., dissenting); Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1286.
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At the outset, the first court to challenge the constitutionality of the individual
mandate focused heavily on the concept of inactivity versus activity. 210 In Florida,
Judge Vinson defined his belief in the activity requirement as axiomatic of the need
for the Commerce Clause analysis.211 The court went on to insist upon an activity
requirement for fear of the inferences one could draw by regulating ―inactivity.‖ 212
Afterward, the Fourth Circuit‘s dissenting opinion responded to the ―parade
of horribles‖ argument by distinguishing between compelling purchases and
compelling consumption.213 Firstly, Judge Davis established that Congress has
compelled purchases in the past and cited the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA)
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA). 214 Secondly, Judge Davis objected to the argument that
allowing the commerce clause to regulate inactivity would allow Congress to
compel people to eat broccoli.215 He stated: ―I note that mandating the purchase
(but not the consumption, which would raise serious constitutional issues) of
broccoli in order to bolster the broccoli market would, in practical effect, be
nothing new.‖216
The argument can be separated into two aspects. The first is that there is a
distinction between compelling the purchase of a commodity and compelling its
consumption.217 Virtually everyone consumes health services within his or her
lifetime.218 The mandate is a purchase mandate and Congress has compelled
purchases in the past.219 Therefore, a mandate to purchase insurance to pay for
those services is not as horrible as opponents like Judge Vinson proclaim. 220 The
second aspect is that compelling the purchase of a product is ―nothing new‖
because ―[s]ince the time of the Founding Fathers. . . the federal government has
used tax revenues to subsidize various industries. Though centralized subsidies are
far more efficient than purchase mandates—which is why a broccoli mandate is
210. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F.Supp.2d at 1285 (discussing whether Congress can exercise its
Commerce Clause powers to regulate inactivity as well as activity).
211. Id. at 1287.
212. Id. (noting that if Congress could regulate inactivity, it would be difficult to imagine anything
that Congress could not regulate).
213. Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 446 (Davis, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (explaining that the MCA requires motor carriers to purchase either liability insurance or a
surety bond to guarantee that damage could be paid for and that CERCLA requires property owners to
remove hazardous substances from contaminated properties even when the owner did not cause the
contamination).
215. Id. at 422 (disagreeing with the appellant that the PPACA would create an unconstitutional
expansion of the government‘s police power through which the government could control nearly every
aspect of one‘s life, including choice of vegetables).
216. Id. at 448.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 440.
219. Id. at 446.
220. See id. at 447 (noting that the individual mandate actually attempts to enhance individual
freedom by allowing persons to make their own decisions about purchasing health insurance).
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purely fantastical—they are, in effect, the same.‖221 This aspect of the argument
centers around the issues of federalism and the taxation power which will be
discussed later in this paper.222
Not all courts accepted the activity/inactivity dichotomy as a proper limiting
principle for the Commerce Power. In the District Court case for Thomas More
Law Center, the court found that the law has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce stating that ―decisions to forego insurance coverage in preference to
attempting to pay for health care out of pocket drive up the cost of insurance‖ and
―[t]he decision whether to purchase insurance or attempt to pay for health care out
of pocket is plainly economic.‖223 The Court then sided with the government and
said everyone will enter the health care market, stating that ―[n]o one can guarantee
his or her health, or ensure that he or she will never participate in the health care
market.‖224 This demonstrated that although the activity/inactivity debate is a
controversial and novel issue, it may not be the critical consideration for our
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence.225
The Sixth Circuit‘s opinion demonstrated that it is possible to abandon the
activity/inactivity inquiry and find PPACA constitutional. 226 The majority opinion
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals of the district court case found that the
commerce clause power includes the regulation of inactivity because, ―[t]he
Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether Congress may use its
Commerce Clause power to regulate inactivity, and it has not defined activity or
inactivity in this context‖227 and ―the constitutionality of the minimum coverage
provision cannot be resolved with a myopic focus on a malleable label.‖ 228 The
concurring opinion of Judge Sutton proposed that the action/inaction dichotomy as
a limiting principle for the commerce power is unlikely to be useful in practice. 229
This is especially the case for health insurance because it deals with the concept of
financial risk and, ―[w]hat is more, inaction is action, sometimes for better,
sometimes for worse, when it comes to financial risk.‖ 230 Furthermore, the line

221. Id. at 448.
222. See infra notes 329–40, 375–479 and accompanying text.
223. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d
529 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
224. Id. at 894.
225. Id. (explaining that the Health Care Reform Act was designed remedy the burden that uninsured
users of health care place on the health care system, and therefore the decision to delay payment of
services should not be considered inactivity).
226. See Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 547 (reasoning that the Commerce Clause does not
distinguish activity and inactivity).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 548.
229. Id. at 560 (Sutton, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 561.
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between action and inaction is unclear. 231 If done responsibly, self-insurance can
actually require more action than purchasing insurance.‖ 232 Instead, Judge Sutton
focused on the inquiry of whether the individual mandate is part of one of
Congress‘s enumerated powers and found that it did.233
Similarly, the dissenting opinion in Liberty did not find the activity versus
inactivity dichotomy to be useful for a limitation on the commerce clause power. 234
However, the issue was not about risk, but about the nature of the health services
market.235 Judge Davis found that the Commerce Clause power simply looked at
whether an activity was economic and whether the aggregated impact of an activity
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.236 Raich demonstrated that
Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not commercial. 237 Judge
Davis argued that virtually everyone will voluntarily enter the interstate health
services market in their lifetime. 238 This action constitutes activity in commerce. 239
Similar to the Sixth Circuit‘s contention, Judge Davis stated: ―[i]t is not clear why
‗sav[ing] for and privately manag[ing] health care,‘ a species of what economists
call ‗self insurance,‘ requires neither ‗effort‘ nor ‗resources‘—in fact, one would
imagine that ‗sav[ing]‘ requires ‗resources‘ (namely, money) and that ‗manag[ing]‘
requires some ‗effort.‘‖240
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the activity/inactivity issue differently and
found that the individual mandate was outside the Commerce Power because it
regulated inactivity.241 That court found a distinction between activity and

231. See id. at 560 (asserting that the establishment of a tangible line that differentiates between
action and inaction is unlikely to succeed in practice).
232. Id. at 561.
233. Id. at 549 (agreeing with the majority in upholding the mandate but specifically framing the
issue as whether Congress may use its Commerce Clause powers to force individuals who do not want
health insurance to purchase insurance as part of a larger national regulatory scheme).
234. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 441–44 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Act is constitutional even if it regulates inactivity), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty
Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
235. See id. at 440 (stating that unlike products in other markets, healthcare is a product that will be
provided regardless of the ability to pay, and it is up to the insured to bear the cost).
236. Id.
237. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (establishing that Congress may regulate local
activities that are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
238. Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 441.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 443; accord Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 548–49 (6th Cir. 2011)
(stating that whether the individual mandate regulates inactivity is not an issue because all individuals
are active in the health care market due to its unique nature), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June
29, 2012).
241. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1294 (11th Cir.
2011) (stating that the mandate expands traditional notions of Congress‘s Commerce Clause power by
regulating an activity that has not yet taken place), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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inactivity by recognizing a temporal difference between the decision to purchase or
not to purchase health insurance and the eventual use of health services. 242 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that prior Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases dealt with
already-existing activity, not the mere possibility of future economic activity. 243
The Eleventh Circuit stated that:
the individual mandate does not regulate behavior at the point of
consumption. Indeed, the language of the individual mandate does
not truly regulate ―how and when health care is paid for.‖ [citations
omitted]. It does not even require those who consume health care to
pay for it with insurance when doing so. Instead, the language of the
individual mandate in fact regulates a related, but different, subject
matter: ―when health insurance is purchased.‖ 244
For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit found the mandate to be over inclusive
of both whom it regulates and when it regulates. 245
On the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit dissent found this temporal difference to
be irrelevant.246 The dissent reasoned that if it is possible for Congress to regulate
economic activity when an individual consumes health care services, there should
be no reason why Congress cannot make the temporal jump to regulate decisions
right now on whether to pay now for health care services rendered in the future. 247
Furthermore,
[t]here is no doctrinal basis for requiring Congress to wait until the
cost-shifting problem materializes for each uninsured person before it
may regulate the uninsured as a class. The majority‘s imposition of a
strict temporal requirement that congressional regulation only apply
to individuals who first engage in specific market transactions in the
health care services market is at odds with the idea that Congress
may adopt ―reasonable preventive measures‖ to avoid future
disruptions of interstate commerce.248
On the individual mandate, the Supreme Court sided with the Eleventh
Circuit‘s majority opinion and ultimately found that it was a regulation on
inactivity outside the scope of the Commerce Clause. 249 When looking at the
Commerce Clause precedent, the Supreme Court stated that ―[a]s expansive as our
cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1295.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1339 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (stating that requiring
individuals to purchase health insurance exceeds Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause).
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thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching ‗activity.‘ It is
nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them.‖ 250 As a result, the Court
found that the individual mandate compels individuals to become active in
purchasing a product.251
The main concern for individual liberty is that the Commerce Clause can be
used to regulate an individual to enter into a commercial activity by doing nothing,
―open[ing] a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority.‖252 The
majority opinion continued to discuss a practical point that ―[e]very day individuals
do not do an infinite number of things. In some cases they decide not to do
something; in others they simply fail to do it.‖253 Allowing this type of mandate on
inactivity, ―would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially make
within the scope of federal regulation, and. . .empower Congress to make those
decisions for him.‖254 The majority opinion also highlighted a hypothetical similar
to Judge Vinson‘s ―parade of horribles‖ that under the government‘s interpretation
an American‘s diet (i.e. the decision to eat broccoli) would fall under the
Commerce Clause Power.255
The Supreme Court also recognized the difficulty of distinguishing between
activity and inactivity but considered it a largely metaphysical discussion. 256
Practically speaking, the majority did not find the fact that virtually every
individual will require health services to be relevant. 257 Instead, they made the
simple observation that ―[t]he phrase ‗active in the market‘ cannot obscure the fact
that most of those regulated by the individual mandate are not currently engaged in
any commercial activity involving health care.‖258 Thus, a limit has been created on
the Commerce Clause power—that evidence sufficient to demonstrate a substantial
effect on interstate commerce cannot rely on economic theory, risk pooling, or
future expectations, no matter how much these relationships are widely accepted as
true.259
250. Id. at 2587.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id. (referring to Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011)) (discussing the virtually limitless federal power that would result if
Congress had the ability to compel individuals to buy health insurance).
256. Id. at 2589 (―To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity;
both have measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing something and
doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were ‗practical statesmen,‘ not metaphysical philosophers.‖).
257. See id. at 2590 (commenting that the Court‘s prior decisions gave no support to the notion that
Congress may compel individuals into activity based on a future expectation regardless of its
inevitability).
258. Id.
259. See id. at 2591 (stating that the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the power to
regulate an individual from birth until death based on his or her propensity to engage in an activity).
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The activity/inactivity issue has evolved considerably over PPACA
litigation.260 It is the most hotly contested and debated issue concerning the
individual mandate.261 The ―inactivity‖ dimension, it is argued, potentially extends
the powers of the federal government beyond an acceptable level; regulating
inactivity is the precedent-changing dimension which some find to be
disconcerting.262 The classic example of buying car insurance is similar to the
individual mandate but is not a perfect analogy. 263 People can consider the purchase
of car insurance as part of the purchase of a car and roll the costs together. 264 The
same can be said for homeowner‘s insurance. 265 Mandates for people or entities
that are in a business (i.e. a waste management business, a chemical company, or
even a hospital) do not evoke the same reaction because the consideration of doing
business and complying with government regulation happens simultaneously. 266
A health insurance mandate, on the other hand, seems to only require that one
be alive.267 This fact seems to force consideration of purchasing health insurance to
occur simultaneously with being born or being alive. 268 The only larger decision

260. See supra notes 204–259 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (noting the difference between the
plaintiffs‘ assertions and government‘s view of the activity or inactivity regulated by PPACA).
262. See, e.g., id. (noting that there is no precedent for Congress requiring an individual to perform
certain conduct because of the individual‘s possible future activity).
263. See Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 38, 40 (2009) (likening insurance mandates and automotive insurance requirements).
264. Id. There are, however, several critics of the car insurance analogy. See Judson Berger, A
Health Insurance that Works Like Auto Insurance? Think Again, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/14/health-insurance-mandate-works-like-auto-insurancethink/ (distinguishing the individual mandate from state laws requiring auto insurance by noting that
purchasing auto insurance is avoidable because individuals can choose not to drive, but purchasing
health insurance is not avoidable under the mandate).
265. See Gina Hamilton, Why Health Care Reform Matters to the Economy, NEW MAINE TIMES
(June 26, 2012), http://www.newmainetimes.org/articles/2012/06/26/why-health-care-reform-matterseconomy/ (explaining that most states already have individual mandates in other contexts, such as
requiring car owners to purchase car insurance and requiring homeowners to buy home insurance).
266. There are two fundamental questions: (1) Do I want to go into business?; and (2) Do I want to
follow government regulations/mandates? Both must be answered with an affirmative or a negative. You
cannot answer ―yes‖ to the first question and answer ―no‖ for the second question without legal
consequences. Answering the first question with a ―no‖ and the second question with a ―yes‖ would lead
to a preposterous result. This is in contrast to a health care mandate which is discussed in the next
paragraph.
267. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1284 (N.D.
Fla. 2011) (noting that the health insurance mandate requires all individuals who are alive and who live
in the United States to buy health insurance), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att‘y
Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
268. Homeowner‘s insurance, auto insurance, and the decision to run a business have two
fundamental questions stated previously. See supra notes 263–266. If we were to draw two analogous
questions with health care mandates, they would be in the form of: (1) Do I want to live; and (2) Do I
want to comply with the health care mandate and purchase health insurance? As stated above, both must
be answered either in the affirmative or the negative. Id. Answering ―yes‖ to one and ―no‖ to the other
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here would be the decision to live. 269 That is why, intuitively, there seems to be a
distinction between a choice to purchase a good or service and the choice to not
enter into that market.
Consider that the characteristics of the health care market that make the
activity/inactivity distinction even more difficult are due to the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). 270 EMTALA requires that hospitals
provide care to anyone needing emergency care regardless of their ability to pay. 271
It is true that virtually everyone uses medical care in their lifetime. 272 However, it is
also important to note that not everyone is paying for the medical care due to the
mandate established by EMTALA.273 An individual‘s decision not to purchase
insurance raises the cost of health services only when hospitals provide free health
services to those without insurance. 274 These unreimbursed costs are shifted to
individuals who pay for insurance and to the government when they reimburse
hospitals through Medicaid and Medicare.275 It is curious to find that an individual
mandate in PPACA was the solution to the funding deficiencies established by
EMTALA.276 These are, in effect, two mandates which are interconnected. 277

would lead to absurd results. Id. However, the answer to (1) must a ―yes‖, implying that the answer of
(2) must be a ―yes‖ as well. Id. This nature of the health care mandate distinguishes it from mandates in
the form of homeowner‘s insurance, automobile insurance, and the decision to run a business. Id.
269. See id.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2011); see also infra notes 271–77 and accompanying text.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
272. See Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2610 (2012) (noting that every
individual will visit some type of health care professional during their lifetime).
273. See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
274. See Avik Roy, Myths of the “Free Rider” Health Care Problem, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/02/02/myths-of-the-free-rider-health-care-problem/ (noting that
when hospitals provide medical care to individuals who cannot pay, EMTALA does not remunerate the
cost of those services).
275. See Daniel Anderson, Would Patients Really “Die on the Sidewalk” in the Absence of
Government Mandates?, FREEDOM WORKS (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.freedomworks.org/blog/danielanderson/would-patients-really-%E2%80%9Cdie-on-the-sidewalk%E2%80%9D-in-the
(commenting
that EMTALA‘s requirement that hospitals provide emergency medical services to all individuals
regardless of individuals‘ ability to pay shifts the burden of paying for care onto the government and
taxpayers).
276. See Avik Roy, The Tortuous History of Conservatives and the Individual Mandate, FORBES
(Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/02/07/the-tortuous-conservative-history-of-theindividual-mandate/ (arguing that the individual mandate resolves the issue of individuals intentionally
choosing not to purchase health insurance because such individuals knew that hospitals would have to
provide emergency care to them under EMTALA).
277. Id; see generally, Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (2011); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).
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4. Limiting Principle to the Commerce Clause: The Health Care Market is
Unique
Proponents of the constitutionality of PPACA that reject ―inactivity‖ as a
proper limiting rule for Congress‘s commerce clause offer their own limiting
principle.278 This limiting principle argues that since the health care market is
unique, there will be no slippery slope problem of a growing and unceasing number
of mandates from the federal government.279 The Sixth Circuit characterized the
health care market as unique based on two factors: ―(1) virtually everyone requires
health care services at some unpredictable point; and (2) individuals receive health
care services regardless of ability to pay.‖280 The court found that Congress had a
rational basis to conclude that self-insuring for health care directly affects interstate
commerce because it shifts costs to third parties through higher costs in health
care.281 The court noted that attempts to avoid using health care will not always be
successful because the health care market often contains unpredictable and
unavoidable needs for care.282 This combined with the fact that EMTALA, state
laws, and many charitable institutions cover those who cannot pay for health care
makes the health care market unique. 283 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that this
uniqueness prevents Congress‘s Commerce power from being overly broad. 284
At the outset, Judge Vinson, as the first judge to rule on the constitutionality
of the individual mandate, objected to the ―uniqueness‖ argument, stating that
―[u]niqueness is not an adequate limiting principle as every market problem is, at
some level and in some respects, unique.‖285 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected
―uniqueness‖ as a limiting factor for two reasons: (1) there is no constitutional basis
for uniqueness as a limiting factor for the commerce power; and (2) uniqueness is
an intensely fact-based criterion and would not be a ―judicially enforceable‖
limitation to the Commerce Power.286

278. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 548 (6th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging
that the individual mandate could be labeled as regulating inactivity but upholding it on the ground that
an individual‘s decision to not buy health insurance substantially affects interstate commerce), cert.
denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
279. See id. at 548–49 (noting that even if the individual mandate seeks to regulate individuals‘
inactivity such regulation is still valid because of the unique nature of the health care market).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1291 (N.D.
Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
286. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1295–96.
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It is interesting to note that one of two factors that make the health care sector
unique requires EMTALA to be in effect. 287 If EMTALA did not require hospitals
to provide emergency care services regardless of the patient‘s ability to pay, then,
arguably, the health care market would not be unique. 288 It is troubling to find that
the uniqueness as a limiting factor for the Commerce Clause has a foundation in
one of the largest unfunded federal mandates. 289
Let us extend the analogy to cell phones. If virtually everyone requires cell
phone services at some unpredictable point and the federal government required all
cell phone towers to send and receive emergency 911 calls from all cell phone
recipients regardless of ability to pay, would it then follow that the government
could mandate that everyone purchase a cell phone plan in an effort to lower the
cost of cell phone plans? 290 If the answer is yes, then it appears the uniqueness
limiting factor allows a government to regulate a market if (1) virtually all people
consume the goods or services in the market and (2) the government mandates that
the suppliers of this good or service offer these goods or services regardless of
ability to pay.291
Since the government is in control of the second prong, the uniqueness
limiting factor rests solely on the first prong. 292 If this is the case, the inquiry is
reduced to whether virtually all people consume the good or service in the market
at some point in time.293 The ―virtually all‖ aspect of the first prong may appear to
be a good way to separate national issues from purely local issues. 294 If everyone in
the nation uses a particular good or service, how can it not be a national issue?
However, consider the following example. Virtually everyone will encounter
vegetables in their lives. Obesity is a national problem. If Congress mandated that

287. See supra notes 278–280 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 270–275 and accompanying text (explaining how EMTALA ties the uninsured
to the rising cost of health care).
289. See, e.g., Damon Dietrich, EMTALA: A Lesson in the Inevitable Futility of Forced Ethics,
COMMON SENSE (Am. Acad. of Emergency Med., Milwaukee, WI), Sept./Oct. 2008, at 26, 28, 29
(arguing that EMTALA was carelessly passed by the government with no form of funding to support the
requirement).
290. See Transcript of Record at 6, Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235 (No. 11-398) (Chief
Justice Roberts asking the Solicitor General whether the government can require individuals to buy a
cell phone if it would improve individuals‘ access to emergency services); see also id. at 7–8
(analogizing the individual mandate to a government requirement that individuals purchase burial
insurance because death is inevitable).
291. See e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd (2011) (requiring a supplier, the hospital, to provide services regardless of a patient‘s ability to
pay.)
292. Id.
293. See Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589–90 (2012) (discussing the
government‘s argument that the mandate is constitutional because all individuals will enter the health
care market because sickness and injury are unavoidable).
294. See id. at 2587 (explaining that healthcare may still be regulated by Congress because the
healthcare market has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce).
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farmers and supermarkets provide vegetables to people regardless of ability to pay,
could they then require that everyone join a super market club to pre-pay for these
vegetables regardless of current consumption? Based on the logic provided by
―uniqueness‖ as a limiting factor, the answer would be yes. 295 This would be
indicative of the ―parade of horribles‖ that could result with the adoption of
uniqueness as a limiting factor for the Commerce Power.296
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not find the uniqueness factor to be
compelling.297 The Court recognized that the health insurance market and health
financing market are ―inherently integrated.‖298 However, the Court continued,
saying ―[b]ut that does not mean the compelled purchase of the [health insurance]
first is properly regarded as a regulation of [health financing]. No matter how
―inherently integrated‖ health insurance and health care consumption may be, they
are not the same thing.‖299 The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the first
uniqueness argument that virtually everyone will require health care services at
some particular point, stating that the purchase of health care services and health
insurance ―involve[s] different transactions, entered into at different times, with
different providers.‖300 The Supreme Court also countered the second uniqueness
argument that individuals receive health care services regardless of ability to pay
with the fact that ―for most of those targeted by the mandate, significant health care
needs will be years, or even decades, away.‖ 301
Note that the core disagreement between the opposing views over the
uniqueness as a proper limiting principle for the Commerce Clause rests on when
and how health care is financed in relation to the purchase of health insurance. 302
Does this mean that the appropriateness of the federal government‘s intervention is
a question of timing and method? Is this what should distinguish between federal
intervention and state intervention? Some may argue that a better limiting principle
should be a focus on the appropriateness of government intervention (either state or
federal) in relation to the problem at hand (classically, either state or local). 303 If the

295. See id. (explaining that the individual mandate compels citizens to join the health care market
because their decision to not buy health insurance impacts interstate commerce).
296. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1288–92
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (discussing the ―parade of horribles‖ that could result in allowing Congress to enact the
individual mandate), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
297. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 267–286 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that
Congress needed to take action to address ―the problem of the uninsured‖ because individual states were
unlikely to adopt successful reforms on their own).
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federal government is more equipped to find a solution to a problem, then the
federal government should have the power to do so and vice versa. 304 Such an
approach is similar to what is called the ―nexus approach.‖ 305 Under this approach,
one would argue that the rising cost of health care is a national problem and,
therefore, there should be a national solution involving the power of a federal
government.306 However, the Eleventh Circuit, using this approach, found
differently.307
5. Nexus Approach of Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit had a different overall approach to the Commerce
Clause Power.308 Their constitutional reasoning focused on whether there was a
proper nexus between the regulated subject matter and interstate commerce. 309 The
Eleventh Circuit did not go into a discussion on whether the subject matter was the
―health insurance market‖ or ―health care market.‖ 310 Instead, the court found that,
―[u]nder any framing, the regulated conduct is defined by the absence of both
commerce or even the ―the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities‖—the broad definition of economics in Raich [citations omitted].‖311
The nexus would require a ―‗but-for causal chain‘ that the Supreme Court has
rejected, as it would allow Congress to regulate anything.‖ 312
The dissent to the Eleventh Circuit‘s majority opinion disagreed.313 Judge
Marcus stated that ―the substantial effect on commerce occurs directly and
immediately when the uninsured consume health care services [and] do not pay for
them.‖314 Thus, there is a nexus between people not purchasing insurance and
interstate commerce.315

304. See, e.g., id. at 2628 (arguing that a national solution is appropriate because individual states
have an inability to address the health care crisis on their own).
305. See Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1293 (11th
Cir. 2011) (stating that the crucial question is whether a regulated activity is connected, or has a
―nexus,‖ to interstate commerce, rather than whether it substantially affects interstate commerce), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
306. See id. at 1246 (commenting that Congress enacted the PPACA in response to the problem of
the fifty million uninsured and their effect on the country‘s economy).
307. Id. at 1293 (reasoning that Congress overstepped its Commerce Clause powers in enacting the
individual mandate provision).
308. See infra notes 309–12 and accompanying text.
309. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1293.
310. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
311. Id. at 1293 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)).
312. Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000)).
313. Id. at 1353 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the connection
between the regulated conduct and interstate commerce is clearly direct).
314. Id.
315. Id.
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Justice Ginsburg‘s concurring opinion adopted many elements of the nexus
approach but found that the individual mandate is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit majority‘s opinion. 316 Justice
Ginsburg emphasized that this is a national problem, 317 and pointed out that States
cannot resolve the problem because
[a]n influx of unhealthy individuals into a State with universal health
care would result in increased spending on medical services. To
cover the increased costs, a State would have to raise taxes, and
private health-insurance companies would have to increase
premiums. Higher taxes and increased insurance costs would, in turn,
encourage businesses and healthy individuals to leave the State.
States that undertake health-care reforms on their own thus risk
―placing themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as
compared with neighbors or competitors.‖318
Therefore, if States are ill equipped to solve the national healthcare problem,
the only solution can come from the federal government and the restraint on the
Commerce Clause harkens back to America under the Articles of Confederation. 319
An analysis of the Eleventh Circuit‘s nexus approach is important because the
opinion highlights the difficulty of a limiting principle for Congress‘s Commerce
Power.320 The nexus approach is promising, since it allows flexibility between state
and federal governments to intervene when appropriate.321 Appropriateness would
be defined by whether the state or federal government is best equipped to face the
problem.322 In many respects, ―appropriateness‖ is a fundamental consideration to
federalism.323 However, it also this approach has the possibility of being too vague
for lower courts to apply. 324 Consider that the Eleventh Circuit majority argued that
the nexus between the rising cost of health care and mandating the purchase of
316. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2617 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(upholding the mandate as a valid exercise of Congress‘s Commerce Clause powers because it relates to
Congress‘s goal to reduce rising health care costs).
317. Id. at 2609 (―The provision of health care is today a concern of national dimension, just as the
provision of old-age and survivors‘ benefits was in the 1930‘s.‖).
318. Id. at 2612.
319. Id. at 2615, 2628.
320. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1293 (noting that Congress must avoid regulating
activities with an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce when exercising its Commerce Clause
powers).
321. See infra notes 322–23 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasizing
that health care reform is a national problem that individual states are not equipped to handle on their
own).
323. Id.
324. Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 548 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that the
individual mandate bears a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097
(U.S. June 29, 2012) with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1293 (finding that the individual
mandate does not bear a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce).
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insurance requires a ―but for causal chain‖ whereas the dissent argues that the
nexus is direct and immediate.325 Justice Ginsburg listed a plethora of
Congressional findings to demonstrate this is a national problem that cannot be
dealt with by states.326 Where one falls on the nexus approach is fact intensive in an
area that is largely a legal debate on an interpretation of the Constitution.327 If the
nexus approach is to have any future in federalism, the Supreme Court will need to
offer more guidance that can be applied consistently. 328
C. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power ―[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.‖ 329 McCulloch v. Maryland
established that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to enact
provisions that are ―incidental to the [enumerated] power, and conducive to its
beneficial exercise.‖330 The Necessary and Proper Clause does not stand on its
own.331 It only expands one of Congress‘s powers already enumerated in the
Constitution.332
In the context of PPACA, the issue is whether the individual mandate is
―necessary and proper‖ for the exercise of PPACA as a whole. 333 From here, we
look to Gonzales v. Raich for guidance of how the Necessary and Proper Clause is
used pursuant to Congress‘s Commerce Clause Power. 334 Raich established that if a
provision is part of a larger regulatory scheme, then it can be upheld under the

325. Compare Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1293 (stating that there was no connection
between decisions not to buy insurance and the effect they have on interstate commerce), with id. at
1353 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the connection between the
decision not to buy health insurance and the effect on interstate commerce is direct and immediate).
326. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2609–15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (showing that
Congress believed a national response was needed to address the problem of rising health care costs and
reduce the number of uninsured).
327. See supra note 325.
328. See supra notes 320–327 and accompanying text.
329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
330. 17 U.S. 316, 418 (1819).
331. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421); see also
Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 310 (1993) (arguing that the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause is limited to powers already granted to Congress).
332. See supra note 331.
333. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585.
334. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005) (explaining that Congress may take all needed
and appropriate measures to effectively regulate interstate commerce).
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Necessary and Proper Clause pursuant to Congress‘s Commerce Clause power. 335
The most striking aspect of Raich is that it supports the notion that the Commerce
Clause affords Congress broad power to regulate even purely local matters that
have substantial economic effects.336 In both Wickard and Raich, the Supreme
Court sustained Congress‘s power to impose obligations on individuals who
claimed not to participate in interstate commerce, because those obligations were
components of broad schemes regulating interstate commerce. 337
The Sixth Circuit found that the individual mandates were part of a larger
regulatory scheme.338 The Court focused on the fact that PPACA ―bans this
practice through a guaranteed issue requirement, which bars insurance companies
from denying coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions; and a
community rating requirement, which prohibits insurance companies from charging
higher rates to individuals based on their medical history.‖ 339 In order for Congress
to make such a rule, there would have to be an individual mandate or people would
be incentivized to delay purchase of insurance only until they actually need medical
care.340 More specifically, the court found that ―seven states that had enacted
guaranteed issue reforms without minimum coverage provisions suffered
detrimental effects to their insurance markets, such as escalating costs and
insurance companies exiting the market. In contrast, Congress found that ‗[i]n
Massachusetts, a [minimum coverage] requirement has strengthened private
employer-based coverage: despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.‘‖ 341 Thus, not only is the
mandate part of a larger regulatory scheme, it is an integral component to the goals
of PPACA.342
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit did not find the individual mandates to be
part of a larger regulatory scheme. 343 First, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the
―larger regulatory scheme‖ doctrine is for as-applied challenges, not facial

335. Id. at 22, 26 (concluding that marijuana is a fungible good and that Congress had a rational
basis for believing that regulating the intrastate possession and manufacture of marijuana was necessary
to regulate interstate commerce).
336. Id. at 17.
337. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129–30 (1942); Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 32–33.
338. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 547 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that
Congress rationally concluded that failing to regulate the self-insured would undermine the larger health
regulatory scheme), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
339. Id. at 546–47.
340. Id. at 547.
341. Id.
342. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2626 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(finding that the individual mandate was essential to increase access to insurance and reduce
uncompensated health care).
343. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1307 (11th Cir.
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
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challenges currently being brought on the constitutionality of PPACA.344 However,
the Eleventh Circuit went further to say that even if the doctrine can be applied to
facial challenges, it would still fail. 345 The court looked to find whether removal of
the mandate would substantially interfere or obstruct the exercise of Congress‘s
powers.346 The Court found that the individual mandate does not interfere with
Congress‘s ability to regulate insurance companies.347 Also, the court held that the
mandate is not meant to enable the execution of other provisions in PPACA but
only to counteract the regulatory costs on insurance companies from the
provisions.348
The dissent in the Eleventh Circuit found that the individual mandate was part
of a larger regulatory scheme. 349 Contrary to the majority opinion, the dissent noted
that the ―larger regulatory scheme‖ doctrine applies to facial challenges because
Lopez applied it in the context of a facial challenge. 350 The dissent found that
PPACA is a comprehensive economic statute and that the economic realities of the
health insurance business make the mandate essential to properly enforcing the
regulations in the Act.351
Chief Justice Robert‘s majority opinion did not discuss whether the individual
mandate was part of a larger regulatory scheme but, instead, focused on whether it
could be upheld based on the Necessary and Proper Clause pursuant to Congress‘s
Commerce Clause.352 Chief Justice Robert‘s opinion stated that ―[e]ach of our prior
cases upholding laws under [the Necessary and Proper Clause] involved exercises
of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power.‖ 353 The majority‘s
fear is that allowing the individual mandate to be upheld by the Necessary and
Proper Clause would give Congress the ability to dictate what it deems necessary in
an exercise of its enumerated powers. 354 Justice Robert‘s opinion stated that ―[e]ven
if the individual mandate is ―necessary‖ to the Act‘s insurance reforms, such an
expansion of federal power is not a ―proper‖ means for making those reforms

344. Id.
345. Id. at 1308.
346. Id. at 1307 (examining whether the individual mandate was a necessary and valid exercise of
Congress‘s Commerce Power to regulate the insurance and health care markets).
347. Id. at 1310.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 1332 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 1354 (explaining that there is no doctrinal basis for using an as-applied challenge to
determine whether or not legislation is an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme since the Court
applied a facial challenge in Lopez).
351. Id. at 1360 (reasoning that the individual mandate was an appropriate method to expand health
insurance coverage to the uninsured due to the unique interconnectedness of the health care and
insurance markets).
352. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591–93 (2012).
353. Id. at 2592.
354. Id. (noting that such a result would allow Congress to ―reach beyond the natural limit of its
authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be outside of it‖).
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effective.‖355 In applying Raich, the Supreme Court found that in Raich, Congress‘s
attempts to regulate interstate market for marijuana would ―be substantially
undercut if it could not also regulate intrastate possession and consumption.‖ 356
They did not find the same to be true for the individual mandate. 357
Justice Ginsburg‘s concurring opinion, on the other hand, found that the
individual mandate could survive the Commerce Clause challenge because it was
part of a broader regulatory scheme. 358 Justice Ginsburg stated that ―Congress
knew, however, that simply barring insurance companies from relying on an
applicant‘s medical history would not work in practice. Without the individual
mandate, Congress learned, guaranteed-issue and community rating requirements
would trigger an adverse-selection death-spiral in the health-insurance market.‖359
The Necessary and Proper Clause has always been controversial, even at its
inception.360 In the drafting of the Constitution, Anti-Federalists were concerned
that it would grant the federal government unlimited power. 361 Federalists, on the
other hand, argued that it would only permit the execution of powers granted by the
Constitution.362 Based on the Supreme Court‘s opinion on this issue, it seems we
have maintained the latter view.363 Nevertheless, there are still divergent views on
Raich‘s application to the individual mandate. 364 There is no argument that the
individual mandate is one of many components of PPACA designed to provide
universal health coverage for all Americans. 365 The individual mandate mechanism
355. Id.
356. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)).
357. Id. at 2593 (stating that Congress‘s attempt to regulate the effects of individuals‘ decision not to
purchase health insurance through the mandate is not a valid exercise of Congress‘s Commerce Clause
Power).
358. Id. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that a complex regulatory program can be a valid
exercise of the Congress‘s Commerce Clause Power without showing that every component of the
program is related to a legitimate congressional goal).
359. Id. at 2626.
360. Compare THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 17, at 44 (Brutus) (Morton Borden ed., 1965) (arguing that
the power granted to the federal government by the Necessary and Proper Clause is so extensive that
state legislatures could be abolished), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 230 (James Madison) (Ian
Shapiro ed., 2009) (―Without the substance of this [Necessary and Proper Clause] power, the whole
Constitution would be a dead letter.‖) (emphasis in original).
361. THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 17, supra note 360, at 44.
362. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 360, at 231 (arguing that even if the Constitution did not
include the Necessary and Proper Clause it was still implied that the government could take all
necessary means to execute its other powers).
363. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591–92 (reasoning that the Court has historically
deferred to Congress on whether a regulation is necessary under the Clause).
364. Compare id. at 2593 (arguing that Raich does not stand for the notion that Congress may
regulate future activity of individuals under the Commerce Clause), with id. at 2619 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Raich demonstrates that Congress has the authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate future individual activity), with id. at 2646 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Raich cannot serve as a precedent supporting Congress‘s enactment of the individual mandate).
365. See id. at 2580 (majority opinion) (―The Act aims to increase the number of Americans covered
by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care.‖); see also id. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J.,
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is meant to work with the prohibition on denial of coverage based on preexisting
conditions to prevent a moral hazard problem. 366 Therefore, in order to reconcile
Raich and National Federation there must be more to the ―regulatory scheme‖ than
simply the presence of a regulatory scheme.367 The ―more‖ is the federalism
dimension.368
Under Raich, the additional regulatory power recognized under the Necessary
and Proper Clause was the ability to regulate intrastate possession and consumption
of marijuana.369 However, this does not preclude the ability of the State police to
enforce their own drug laws. 370 The individual mandate, on the other hand, would
preclude state regulation on the ―inactivity‖ of their citizen‘s insurance choices. 371
The structure of the individual mandate could be expanded to other types of
inactivity, removing state power without the state having any recourse (or even any
concurrent power, as with the drug enforcement power noted in Raich).372
Therefore, when we say that the Necessary and Proper Clause was never meant to
expand federal power, we must be more precise and say that it was never meant to
expand federal power at the expense of state power.373
D. The Taxing Power
The other constitutional issue related to the individual mandate provision is
whether Congress can enforce an exaction for failure to purchase insurance under
Congress‘s Taxing Power.374 The Taxing and Spending Clause states: ―Congress
shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States.‖375 The Taxing Power argument was that PPACA was enacted under the
Taxing Power because the individual mandate exaction is a tax meant to provide

concurring) (―A central aim of the ACA is to reduce the number of uninsured U.S. residents.‖); id. at
2642 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (―Congress has set out to remedy the problem that the best health care is
beyond the reach of many Americans who cannot afford it.‖).
366. See id. at 2614 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (contending that requiring insurance companies to
provide coverage allows an individual to wait to get sick and purchase insurance at that point, which
would be substantially less than the cost of direct medical care).
367. See supra notes 334–359 and accompanying text (noting that the decisions in Raich and Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. both address a larger regulatory scheme yet reach different conclusions).
368. See infra notes 369–373 and accompanying text.
369. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5, 9 (2005).
370. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C (2012) (regulating controlled substances at the state level).
371. The inability of States to regulate against the individual mandate is further explored in Part VI.
372. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Raich, 545 U.S. at 5, 9.
373. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 181 (2003) (discussing the origins and meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
374. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
375. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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for the general welfare of the United States. 376 This was ultimately the position the
Supreme Court adopted.377 However, the analysis does not end here. It is important
to understand the historical context in which the Supreme Court made its decision
because it will directly shape the future of federalism.
The issue here is whether the individual mandate exaction is a tax or a
penalty.378 If it is a tax, then Congress has the ability under the Taxing Power to tax
people and use those funds for the general welfare. 379 If it is not a tax, then the
exaction would not fall under the Taxing Power and Congress would need to rely
on another power to sustain the individual mandate.380
Originally, the Fourth Circuit was the first court to deem that the individual
mandate exaction is a tax.381 However, unlike the Supreme Court‘s decision, the
Fourth Circuit found that if the mandate is deemed a tax, then the Court would be
precluded by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) from ruling on the constitutional
issue.382 The AIA provides that ―no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person.‖383 The AIA forbids pre-enforcement actions brought before the IRS. 384
The taxpayer would be allowed to pay the assessment and then seek a refund from
the IRS.385 If the IRS refuses, then the taxpayer may bring the refund action to
federal court.386 Therefore, in order to bring the constitutional issue of whether the
individual mandate exaction is a tax for the purposes of Congress‘s taxing power,
the individual would have to have paid the exaction. 387 Since the individual
mandate does not go into effect until 2014,388 the debate over whether the
individual mandate exaction is a tax would be delayed by the AIA until that time. 389

376. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 420 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J., concurring)
(explaining that the individual mandate provides for the general welfare because the provision was
designed to reduce the number of uninsured, which subsequently reduces health care costs for those who
are insured as well), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29,
2012).
377. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (holding that the individual mandate is a
valid exercise of Congress‘s taxing power).
378. Id. at 2593–94.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 409.
382. Id. at 397.
383. Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2011).
384. Id.
385. 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (2011).
386. Id.
387. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 403 (denying judicial review of the individual mandate
because the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits review of IRS pre-enforcement actions).
388. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2011).
389. See supra notes 378–388 and accompanying text.
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Prior to the Fourth Circuit‘s opinion, every federal court had unanimously
held that the individual mandate exaction was a penalty not a tax. 390 There was so
much confidence in this unanimity that the Eleventh Circuit commented that
[i]t is not surprising to us that all of the federal courts, which have
otherwise reached sharply divergent conclusions on the
constitutionality of the individual mandate, have spoken on this issue
with clarion uniformity.. . . all have found, without exception, that
the individual mandate operates as a regulatory penalty, not a tax. 391
Furthermore, in the Fourth Circuit case, Liberty v. Geithner, both the
plaintiffs and the defendants also argued that the individual mandate exaction is a
penalty and not subject to the AIA‘s preclusion, and the opposing parties asked the
Court to rule on the merits of the case. 392 The Fourth Circuit declined and instead
opined that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the merits due to the AIA preenforcement bar.393
Thus, the entire country was awaiting a decision by the Supreme Court
largely based on the Commerce Clause Power. 394 Instead, the Supreme Court found

390. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1315
(11th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the individual mandate was a penalty because it imposes a monetary
sanction on individuals who violate the law), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539 (6th Cir.
2011) (reasoning that because Congress called the individual mandate exaction a penalty and the AntiInjunction Act only bars pre-enforcement of taxes, the AIA did not bar the Court from hearing the case),
cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470097 (U.S. June 29, 2012); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728
F.Supp.2d 768, 787–88 (E.D. Va. 2010) (concluding that the individual mandate ―is, in form and
substance, a penalty as opposed to a tax,‖ and therefore, Congress must derive alternative authority to
enact the provision), vacated, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470098 (U.S.
June 29, 2012); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 611, 629 (W.D. Va. 2010) (noting that
Congress specifically chose not to label the mandate as a tax despite labeling other exactions in the Act
as taxes), vacated, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012
WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012). Even where there were dissenting opinions, each court was
unanimous in concluding that the individual mandate exaction was a penalty. See, e.g., Florida ex rel.
Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1330 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (implying agreement
with the majority as to the characterization of individual mandate by describing it as ―requiring nonexempted individuals to pay a penalty,‖ rather than a tax); Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 567
(Graham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―Individuals who fail to satisfy the ‗individual
responsibility requirement‘ must pay a monetary penalty.‖).
391. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1314.
392. See Supplemental Brief of Appellants Liberty University, Michele G. Waddell and Joanne V.
Merrill at 2, Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d 391 (No. 10-2347) (arguing that the fines associated with the
mandates are penalties under the Commerce Clause, not taxes under the Taxing and Spending Clause);
see also Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 2–3, id. (No. 10-2347) (distinguishing the minimum
coverage penalty from the penalties contained in other portions of the Internal Revenue Code that are
deemed taxes for Anti-Injunction Act purposes).
393. See Supplemental Brief of Appellants supra note 392, at 2; Supplemental Brief for Appellees,
supra note 392, at 9.
394. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Anticipating the health-care decision: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 27, 2012, 10:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/anticipating-the-health-care-decision-
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that the individual mandate was beyond Congress‘s Commerce Clause power, yet
upheld it based on Congress‘s Taxing Power.395 This decision was surprising to
many, including President Obama himself, who still contended that the mandate is
not a tax even after the Supreme Court holding. 396
The Supreme Court‘s decision was made in light of the controversy that
surrounded the constitutionality of the individual mandate along with a great
concern for the principles of federalism. 397 Therefore, it is important to understand
the arguments both for and against the individual mandate exaction being a tax to
understand how far the federal government‘s power can extend in relation to the
powers reserved to the states.398
1. The Individual Mandate Exaction is a Penalty
The argument that the individual mandate exaction is a penalty uses rules of
statutory interpretation.399 The Eleventh Circuit stated that ―[t]he plain language of
the statute and the well-settled principles of statutory construction overwhelmingly
established that the individual mandate is not a tax, but rather a penalty.‖400 The
Eleventh Circuit then analyzed the plain language of the statute and the legislative
history to support the argument that the exaction is a penalty and not a tax. 401
The plain language of the individual mandate frequently uses the word
―penalty‖ to refer to the individual mandate exaction. 402 The Eleventh Circuit
pointed out that this language was not a ―careless one-time invocation of the word
in-plain-english (characterizing the issue before the Court as the constitutionality of the Act pursuant to
the Commerce Clause).
395. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593, 2598.
396. See, e.g., Byron Tau, Obama campaign: It’s a penalty, not a tax, POLITICO, (June 29, 2012,
10:49
AM),
http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/06/obama-campaign-its-a-penalty-not-a-tax127721.html (reporting that the President and one of his a top political allies argued that the individual
mandate even after the Supreme Court‘s decision held that it was).
397. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577–80 (explaining that the constitutionality of
the individual mandate must be decided with the deference that the Court must give to notions of
federalism).
398. See supra notes 378–380 and accompanying text (explaining the implications of whether or not
the mandate is a tax). See also discussion infra Parts IV.D.1–3.
399. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314–17 (11th
Cir. 2011) (applying principles of statutory interpretation in concluding that the individual mandate
exaction is a penalty), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012).
400. Id. at 1314.
401. Id. at 1314–20 (citing Congress‘s repetition of the word ―penalty‖ in the mandate and clear
designation of other provisions in the Act as taxes, among other factors, as evidence that the exaction is
a penalty).
402. See id. at 1315 (noting the mandate provision‘s multiple references to ―penalty‖ including the
statement that ―[i]f a taxpayer who is an applicable individual . . . fails to meet the requirement of
subsection (a) for 1 or more months, then . . . there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with
respect to such failures‖) (emphasis added by Court) (quoting Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (2011)).
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‗penalty,‘ because the remainder of the relevant provisions in § 5000A‖ use the
term ―penalty‖ repeatedly in reference to the mandate without ever describing it as
a ―tax.‖403 Also, there are other provisions in PPACA that use the term ―tax‖
instead of ―penalty.‖404 These provisions, according to the Eleventh Circuit, are
―unmistakably taxes‖ and ―Congress knows full well how to enact a tax when it
chooses to do so.‖405 Furthermore, the congressional findings about the individual
mandate support the argument that the exaction is designed to be a penalty. 406 The
Supreme Court found that Congress does not need to explicitly label a provision as
a ―tax,‖ nor does it need to ―expressly invoke the Taxing and Spending Clause, in
order to enact a valid tax.‖407 However, Congress did not use the term ―tax,‖ nor
did they invoke the Taxing and Spending Clause, when explaining the
constitutional basis of the individual mandate.408
In statutory construction, when the plain language is unclear, courts resort to
the legislative history to determine the meaning of a provision. 409 The Eleventh
Circuit continued its analysis of the legislative history to bolster its argument that
the individual mandate exaction is a penalty not a tax. 410 Preliminary versions of
the Act that married an individual mandate and a ―tax‖ were introduced in both the
House and Senate prior to PPACA‘s ultimate enactment.411 The final version of

403. Id.
404. Id. at 1316 (pointing to four other provisions of the Act that undoubtedly create taxes, rather
than penalties including a tax on medical device manufacturers, a tax on high cost employer-sponsored
health coverage, an additional hospital insurance tax for high-income taxpayers, and a tax on indoor
tanning services).
405. Id.
406. Id. The Court pointed out that Congress explicitly relied on its Commerce Clause authority in
its legislative findings, stating that, ―[t]he individual responsibility requirement provided for in this
section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce . . . .‖
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(1)) (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court surmised
that the focus on commerce in the findings indicated ―that the goal of the individual mandate is not to
raise revenue for the public fisc, but rather to . . . reduce the number of the uninsured.‖ Id.
407. Id. at 1317 (citing Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (―[T]he
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise.‖)).
408. Id.
409. See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 246 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (―Where the plain
language of a statute is ambiguous, a court may go beyond the words of the statute to examine . . . the
legislative history.‖) (quoting United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 298 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 2000) (―The language of
the statute is the starting point for interpretation . . . . we may look to the legislative history of a statute if
the statutory language is unclear.‖) (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Cullen, 499 F.3d 157, 163
(2d Cir. 2007) (―When statutory language is unambiguous . . . we need not look to its title or history to
determine its meaning.‖).
410. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1317.
411. Id. The 11th Circuit cited several such congressional bills that were precursors to PPACA. Id.
(noting, for instance, the introduction of one bill, America‘s Affordable Choices Act of 2009 in the
House of Representatives which provided that ―there is hereby imposed a tax‖ on ―any individual who
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PPACA replaced the term ―tax‖ with ―penalty.‖ 412 The Eleventh Circuit
commented that ―[t]his is no mere semantic distinction, as ‗[f]ew principles of
statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does
not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in
favor of other language.‖413
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that
the individual mandate was not a tax.414 However, instead of going into a lengthy
analysis of the statutory interpretation of Congress‘s intention, Justice Scalia based
his disagreement almost entirely on the fact that holding a provision to be both a
penalty and a tax is unprecedented in the history of the country.415 The dissenting
opinion considered a penalty and a tax to be mutually exclusive terms. 416 However,
the dissenting opinion did indicate that if the dissenting Justices were to do a
statutory interpretation, they would still find the individual mandate to be a penalty,
stating that ―[w]e have no doubt that Congress knew precisely what it was doing
when it rejected an earlier version of this legislation that imposed a tax instead of a
requirement-with-penalty.‖417
The idea that the individual mandate exaction is a penalty is strong if we look
to the rules of statutory interpretation and the historical context of PPACA. 418 The
idea that the exaction is a tax for the purposes of the taxing power or the AIA was
not prominent until the Fourth Circuit opinion. 419 Thus, when the Supreme Court
found the individual mandate to be a tax, it came as great and unexpected surprise,
even to the Obama Administration.420
2. The Individual Mandate Exaction is a Tax
As noted above, the Fourth Circuit‘s majority opinion in Liberty v. Geithner
was the only opinion that had found that the individual mandate exaction was a
tax.421 If the individual mandate exaction operates as a tax, then it would fall under
Congress‘s Taxing and Spending power. 422 However, before any ruling on the
does not meet the requirements of [maintaining minimum health insurance coverage] at any time during
the taxable year.‖)
412. Id.
413. Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 422–23 (1987)).
414. See Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651–52 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that it would require judicial ―rewriting‖ and contravention of Court precedent to
find that Congress intended the individual mandate to be a tax).
415. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2651–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 2651 (noting that the Court has always held provisions like the individual mandate to be
either a penalty or a tax).
417. Id. at 2655.
418. See supra notes 399–413and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 382–383, 390–391 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 395–396 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 382, 390 and accompanying text.
422. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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Taxing and Spending power could be made, the Fourth Circuit had to make a
determination on whether the AIA precluded a court from deciding the issue. 423
The Fourth Circuit‘s majority opinion analyzed whether the individual mandate
exaction was a tax for the purpose of the AIA and found that they were precluded
from ruling on the mandate under the AIA. 424 However, Judge Wynn‘s concurring
opinion still admitted that ―[he] would uphold the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act on the basis that Congress had the authority to enact the
individual and employer mandates under its plenary taxing power.‖ 425
The original argument in the Fourth Circuit that the individual mandate
exaction was a tax relied on a very broad definition of the term ―tax.‖ 426 According
to the majority opinion by Judge Motz, ―[a] ‗tax, in the general understanding of
the term,‘ is simply ‗an exaction for the support of the government.‘‖ 427 The
purpose of the AIA is to ensure prompt collections of lawful revenue by preventing
taxpayers from avoiding payment of taxes with pre-enforcement lawsuits.428 The
use of the term ―tax‖ in the AIA is meant to include ―penalties‖ as ―taxes.‖ 429
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently found that labels have little
impact in determining whether an exaction is a ―tax‖ or a ―penalty‖.430 In fact, the
Fourth Circuit goes even further, saying that ―[a]ccordingly, it is simply irrelevant
what the 2010 Congress would have thought about the AIA; all that matters is
whether the 2010 Congress imposed a tax,‖ implying that any statutory
interpretation of legislative intent for the AIA would be irrelevant even though the
statute‘s interpretation is ambiguous. 431
However, the Supreme Court saw things differently even though it agreed
with the Fourth Circuit that the individual mandate was a tax.432 The Supreme
Court reasoned that ―[t]he Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act. . . are
creatures of Congress‘s own creation. How they relate to each other is up to
Congress, and the best evidence of Congress‘s intent is the statutory text.‖433 The

423. See Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2011); see also supra notes 383–389.
424. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 415 (4th Cir. 2011) (barring judicial review under
the AIA), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012); see
also see supra notes 382–389 and accompanying text.
425. Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 415 (Wynn, J., concurring).
426. Id. at 402 (majority opinion) (citing Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 192 (1883)) (―[A]n
exaction constitutes a ‗tax‘ for purposes of the AIA so long as the method prescribed for its assessment
conforms to the process of tax enforcement.‖).
427. Id. at 401 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936)).
428. Id. at 402 (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1962))
(noting that the Supreme Court has construed ―tax‖ in its broadest sense because the AIA aims to
promote the expedient collection of taxes without undue delays due to disputed amounts).
429. Id.
430. Id. at 404.
431. Id. at 410.
432. See infra notes 433–35 and accompanying text.
433. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012).
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Supreme Court ultimately gave Congress full discretion on whether the AIA
applies, stating that ―Congress can, of course, describe something as a penalty but
direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction
Act,‖434 thus creating a peculiar legal doctrine which allows the individual mandate
to be a tax for the purposes of enforcement but not a tax for the purposes of the
AIA.435
In the Fourth Circuit opinion that the individual mandate was a tax, Judge
Wynn‘s concurring opinion took a practical approach to determine that the
individual exaction is a tax.436 The four practical considerations were (1)
―[i]ndividuals who are not required to file income tax returns are not required to
pay the penalty‖;437 (2) ―[t]he amount of any penalty owed is generally calculated
by reference to household income and reported on an individual‘s federal income
tax return‖;438 (3) ―taxpayers filing jointly are jointly liable for the penalty‖; 439 and
(4) ―the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to enforce the provision like a tax,
albeit with several procedural exceptions.‖ 440 These considerations support the idea
that the penalty operates more like a tax than a penalty. 441
Even though the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed on the
application of the AIA, they had similar rationales for deeming the individual
mandate as a tax.442 Chief Justice Robert‘s opinion sought to give deference to
Congress, stating that ―it is well established that if a statute has two possible

434. Id.
435. Id. at 2594 (explaining that Congress‘s description of the mandate as a ―penalty‖ and not a
―tax‖ would be ―fatal‖ under the Anti-Injunction Act, but that Congress also has discretion in applying
the Anti-Injunction Act to a specific statute, and that Congress‘s choice of a different label does not
preclude it from enacting the provision pursuant to congressional taxing power).
436. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 418 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J., concurring)
(noting that the assessment of an exaction‘s constitutionality requires examination of its practical
operation rather than deference to its choice of label).
437. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 418 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J., concurring), cert.
denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
438. Id. at 418–19.
439. Id. at 419.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. See Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (reasoning that the
individual mandate looks like a tax in many respects because ―the shared responsibility payment‖ is paid
into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns, it does not apply to individuals who do
not pay federal income taxes because their household income is less than the Internal Revenue Code‘s
filing threshold, the amount that taxpayers who do owe the payment is determined by taxable income,
number of dependants, and joint filing status, and the IRS must assess and collect the payment in the
same manner as taxes); Liberty Univ., 671 F.3d at 418–19 (Wynn, J., concurring) (reasoning that ―the
practical operation of the individual mandate provision is as a tax [because] [i]ndividuals who are not
required to file income tax returns are not required to pay the penalty[,]… [t]he amount of any penalty
owed is generally calculated by reference to household income and reported on an individual‘s federal
income tax return[,]… [t]axpayers filing jointly are jointly liable for the penalty[,]… [a]nd the Secretary
of the Treasury is empowered to enforce the provision like a tax‖).
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meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning
that does not do so.‖443 Given that prior to the Supreme Court‘s ruling, the majority
of people believed the individual mandate to be a penalty, 444 the Court was willing
to go against the vast majority of previous judicial opinions and adopt a
contradictory holding regarding the AIA to maintain the constitutionality of
PPACA.445 The standard given by the Supreme Court on how to interpret the
mandate draws from Hooper v. California, which stated that ―every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.‖446 This indicates very high bar needed to invalidate a law
passed by Congress on constitutional grounds. 447
The Supreme Court‘s majority opinion set forth several reasons why the
individual mandate can be considered a tax similar to the Fourth Circuit rationale
by Judge Wynn.448 Firstly, there is a ―shared responsibility payment‖ which is paid
to the Treasury when taxpayers file their tax returns. 449 Second, the individual
mandate would not apply to individuals whose household income is less than the
filing threshold for the Internal Revenue Service. 450 Third, the amount owed is
determined based on factors like taxable income, number of dependents, and joint
filing status.451 Fourth, the requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue
Code and enforced by the IRS, which must assess and collect the individual
mandate ―in the same manner as taxes.‖ 452 Thus, for the majority, the individual
mandate could be construed as a tax since its application is very similar to other
taxes.453

443. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).
444. See supra notes 396, 420–21 and accompanying text (noting that the majority of courts, as well
as President Obama, did not consider the mandate to be a tax).
445. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593 (determining that although the
individual mandate is not a ―tax‖ for the purposes of Anti-Injunction Act, the mandate is a valid ―tax‖
under Congress‘s taxing powers), with Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 423 (Davis, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the majority‘s application of the Anti-Injunction Act to bar judicial review of the
mandate deviated from the judgments of nine other federal judges that the Anti-Injunction Act was not
applicable to mandates of PPACA).
446. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895)).
447. Id. at 2593 (quoting Hooper, 155 U.S. at 657) (providing that a reviewing court should consider
―every reasonable construction‖ of a statute before striking it down as unconstitutional).
448. See id. at 2594; see also Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 418–19 (Wynn, J., concurring); see
infra notes 449–53 and accompanying text.
449. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. (noting that the individual mandate resembles a tax because the penalty produces revenue
for the government and the penalty amount is determined by taxable income, joint filing status, and
number of dependents).
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The majority opinion also distinguished the individual mandate from a
penalty using precedent established in Drexel Furniture.454 In Drexel, (1) the tax
imposed was very large (ten percent of a company‘s net income), (2) it had a
scienter requirement typical of punitive statutes, and (3) the tax was enforced by the
Department of Labor, a department that typically punishes, not collects revenues. 455
In contrast, for the individual mandate, (1) the amount due is far less than the price
of insurance and, by statute, can never be more, (2) there is no scienter requirement,
and (3) payment is collected solely through the IRS using normal means of
taxation (and the IRS is not allowed to use other means that are suggestive of
punitive sanction).456 Ultimately, when determining whether the individual mandate
was a penalty, the Supreme Court looked to whether Congress intended ―not
buying insurance‖ to be an ―unlawful‖ act.457
3. The Taxing Power and Federalism
The idea that the individual mandate exaction is a tax has major implications
on federalism.458 Congress‘s Taxing Power is broader than its Commerce power
since the Taxing Power only looks to whether revenue was raised and whether it
was used for the general welfare.459 The Commerce Clause, on the other hand,
looks at the nature of the regulation and whether it properly fits into the categories
established by the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent. 460 This is why the
majority opinion in the Supreme Court placed limitations on when a penalty can be
considered a tax.461 However, before discussing the implications of the Supreme
Court‘s decision on federalism, it is important to compare an individual mandate as
a tax to a single payer system where there healthcare is funded by the government
via a general tax on the public.462
Consider the alternative of taxing the general public and spending the general
welfare for the unreimbursed emergency care that PPACA seeks to address. 463

454. Id. at 2595–96.
455. Id. at 2595.
456. Id. at 2595–96.
457. Id. at 2597.
458. See supra notes 397–98 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VI.
459. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599–600 (explaining that upholding the mandate
under the Commerce Clause would raise questions about the scope of Congressional power but that
Congress‘s broad discretion under the Taxing Clause has long been recognized).
460. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (emphasizing that the Commerce Clause
allows Congress to regulate three categories of activity including the use of interstate commerce
channels, the persons or things in interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce).
461. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (discussing the numerous similarities
between the penalty and other taxes, which supports the Court‘s conclusion that the mandate is a tax).
462. See infra notes 463–73 and accompanying text.
463. Cf. Stuart M. Butler, A Tax Reform Strategy to Deal With the Uninsured, 265 JAMA 2541
(1991) (proposing elimination of the tax exclusion of employer-provided health plans from the tax code
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Proponents of the idea that the individual mandate exaction is a tax would likely
assert that there is no distinction.464 However, if an exaction was based on people‘s
action, then some people would pay the exaction while others would be free from
it.465 The amount of taxes paid for each individual would be different not based on
income, but based on one‘s actions. 466 The current tax structure taxes people based
on higher income or higher spending. 467 The rationale is that the marginal benefit of
an extra dollar of someone who makes a lot of money is much less than the
marginal benefit of an extra dollar from someone who makes a near poverty
wage.468 Therefore, taxing someone with a higher income at a higher rate does not
greatly burden those taxpayers.469 Taxing someone with a lower income at a lower
rate alleviates the strain of taxes for those taxpayers. 470 The same is true for
spending.471 If an exaction from a mandate is considered a tax under Congress‘s
broad Taxing Power, the policy behind the tax is no longer based on whether
people can afford the tax but, instead, on whether they are following Congress‘s
idea of what a citizen should do.472 This opens the possibility of disproportionately

and the implementation of a new system of refundable tax credits in which workers could include health
packages as taxable income to deal with the problem of the uninsured), with Carol K. Kane, Ph.D.,
Physician Marketplace Report: The Impact of EMTALA on Physician Practices, AMA Center for Health
Policy Research (February 2003), available at www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/363/pmr200302.pdf (noting that emergency medicine physicians attributed sixty-one percent of their debt to costs
relating to unreimbursed emergency care).
464. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 416 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J., concurring)
(reasoning that an exaction is a tax not because of its label but because of its purpose, which is to
produce revenue), cert. denied, sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2012 WL 2470099 (U.S. June 29,
2012).
465. This, of course, depends on the action an exaction depends on. If it is an action all individuals
participate in (i.e. breathing), then everyone will be taxed the same way. However, if the action an
exaction depends on is one in which participation is voluntary, some would have to pay while others
would not. For example, driving is a voluntary activity, and therefore not everyone pays parking or
speeding tickets. See supra notes 261–64 and accompanying text.
466. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2011) (requiring individuals who fail to purchase minimum essential
insurance coverage to pay a certain sum to the IRS).
467. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2011 TAX TABLE (2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040tt.pdf.
468. See Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, “Globalization,”
and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731, 745 n.30 (2000) (―It is easy to suppose that the utility of
an additional dollar will be greater to a serf than to a lord.‖).
469. Id. (arguing that the wealthy have a greater taxpaying capacity and thus a greater responsibility
to contribute to those less fortunate).
470. Id.
471. Id. at 745–46 (explaining that sales tax increases with spending and therefore follows the same
payment structure as income tax).
472. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1351 (11th Cir.
2011) (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that upholding the mandate
would allow the federal government to compel citizens to purchase and consume what it thinks its
citizens should), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012); see also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256,
1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (noting the constitutional concerns surrounding the mandate because there are
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burdening lower income tax payers, compelling them to act when they originally
would not.473
The dynamics described above explain why it was important for Congress to
create provisions exempting lower income individuals from being subject to the
individual mandate exaction.474 It also explains why the Supreme Court found it
necessary to limit the application of a penalty pursuant to Congress‘s Taxing Power
only to penalties that have the same structure as an income tax (which takes into
account the marginal differences between a lower income individual and a higher
income individual).475 However, if the individual mandate was meant to compel the
uninsured to purchase insurance, thus creating universal health coverage, can an
individual mandate that has a limited enforcement power be compelling ―enough‖
for the program to work? 476 If the individual mandate is integral to the overall
structure of what PPACA is trying to achieve, what happens to the other provisions
that depend on it (i.e. banning denials for preexisting condition 477) if the individual
mandate fails to compel the uninsured to purchase insurance?
Finding the individual mandate is constitutional under the Taxing Power may
have been a short-term victory for proponents of PPACA, but the long-term effects
are still unknown.478 Furthermore, since individual mandates are only allowed
under the Taxing Power provided that they have the enforcement power of taxes,
they will inevitably be politically unpopular. 479 In upholding the mandate under the
Taxing Power, the Supreme Court may have essentially invalidated individual
mandates as a viable tool for regulation by the federal government to regulate its
people. In theory, opponents of PPACA might consider this a victory.

several markets that people cannot ―opt out‖ of), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Florida ex rel.
Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235.
473. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1351 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
474. See supra text accompanying notes 448–57.
475. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–600 (2012).
476. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Can Obama’s Health Care Law Survive Without the Individual
Mandate?, CBSNEWS (Mar. 27, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_16257404791-503544/can-obamas-health-care-law-survive-without-the-individual-mandate/ (questioning
whether PPACA would have any enforcement power without the mandate).
477. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 18001(d)(3) (2010) (noting that individuals with preexisting conditions would
be covered by PPACA).
478. See generally Clark Neily, Unintended Consequences, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 9:54
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/unintended-consequences (noting that the effect of the
Court‘s decision on the scope of federal power will not be immediately clear).
479. See generally KAISER PUBLIC OPINION, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 8296 (Mar. 2012),
available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8296.pdf (showing that the individual mandate is
consistently the least popular portion of PPACA and that the mandate is disfavored by the general public
two-to-one).
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V. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE: MEDICAID EXPANSION AND THE STATES
The federalism dimension is not only important in an analysis of individual
mandates. It also is critical to the Medicaid expansion provisions of PPACA, and it
represents one of the issues reviewed by the Supreme Court. 480 Medicaid represents
forty percent of all federal funds awarded to states and seven percent of all federal
spending.481
In this context, the Supreme Court examined a core issue: are the
requirements of PPACA, with respect to Medicaid, ―coercive‖ to the states and,
therefore, incompatible with federalism, not consistent with the 10 th amendment to
the U.S. constitution?482 In other words, the Court addressed the question of
whether state sovereignty is violated by PPACA.483
As already noted, PPACA requires that states expand the Medicaid program
by increasing income eligibility to 133% of the federal poverty level as of January
1, 2014.484 This greatly expands the program, and causes a significant increase in
enrollment and expenditures.485 However, the most significant change for Medicaid
is the extension of Medicaid eligibility to adults with low income, particularly
childless adults.486 Currently, only five states offer full Medicaid benefits to
childless adults.487
In the federalism context, these provisions call the ―cooperative‖ nature of the
Medicaid program into question.488 Can this program continue to be considered
―cooperative‖ with the new federal requirements for the states?489 Under PPACA,

480. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601–09 (analyzing whether PPACA‘s Medicaid
expansion provisions are within Congress‘s Spending Clause powers).
481. George Will, A Supreme Obamacare Test, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/supreme-court-on-obamacare-something-to-argueabout/2012/01/20/gIQAYdjoEQ_story.html.
482. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601–09.
483. Id. at 2601–02.
484. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2011); see also Brian Blase, Obamacare and Medicaid: Expanding a
Broken Entitlement and Busting State Budgets, HERITAGE FOUND., 1, 2 n.3 (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/wm3107.pdf (explaining that the reconciliation bill
effectively raised the eligibility to one hundred and thirty-eight percent of the federal poverty level).
485. Blase, supra note 484.
486. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2011); see generally LYNDA FLOWERS, AARP PUB. POL‘Y INST., FACT
SHEET NO. 185, HEALTH REFORM PROVIDES NEW FEDERAL MONEY TO HELP STATES EXPAND
MEDICAID (2010), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/health-care/fs185-health-reform.pdf
(noting that approximately eighty percent of the new enrollees covered by the Medicaid expansion will
be childless adults).
487. See INST. OF GOV‘T & PUB. AFF., STATE SUMMIT REPORT ON MEDICAID 6 (2010), available at
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/state-summit-report-on-medicaid.pdf.
488. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601–09 (analyzing whether the Medicaid expansion
provision of PPACA coerces states to implement changes to the Medicaid program by withholding
funding).
489. Id.
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the federal government will pay for the increased costs of Medicaid up to the year
2016; by 2020, states are required to pay ten percent of the expansion. 490
This expansion is in addition to the growth in Medicaid enrollment by nearly
6 million from December 2007 to December 2009.491 Medicaid enrollment has
lagged behind Medicaid spending, which is consistent with the fact that health
insurance premiums have grown at a much quicker rate than inflation and
savings.492 As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA),
states received ―enhanced‖ federal Medicaid matching funds and used these funds
to Medicaid general fund expenditures in FY 2009 and FY 2010. 493 At the same
time, ARRA prohibited states from reducing eligibility for Medicaid.494 Stimulus
dollars though ARRA no longer added revenue to the Medicaid program as of June
of 2011.495 But the requirements that prohibited states from reducing eligibility are
now incorporated into PPACA. 496
Another key feature of PPACA with respect to Medicaid is the ―maintenance
of effort‘ requirement, which stipulates that:
a state shall not have in effect eligibility standards, methodologies, or
procedures under the State plan under the title or under any waiver of
such plan that is in effect during that period, that are more restrictive
than the eligibility standards, methodologies, or procedures,
respectively, under the plan or waiver that are in effect on the date of
enrollment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 497
In other words, PPACA requires that states continue their current Medicaid
and State Children‘s Health Insurance Program eligibility levels in order to receive
any federal dollars for their programs. 498 This requirement is designed to prevent
states from reducing enrollment in their Medicaid programs and pushing lowincome residents into the federally mandated and funded insurance exchanges. 499
States are also prohibited from imposing new paperwork and other barriers that
would make it more difficult for people to enroll in Medicaid or SCHIP. 500 States
that do not meet these requirements will be considered to be ―noncompliant‖ and

490. Will, supra note 481.
491. KAISER COMM‘N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 805004, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT: DECEMBER 2010 DATA SNAPSHOT 1 fig.1 (2011), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8050-04.pdf.
492. INST. OF GOV‘T & PUB. AFF., supra note 487, at 5.
493. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 §§ 5000–5001, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a), (d)
(2011).
494. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(f).
495. Id.
496. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10201(a)(4)(cc), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2011).
497. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg) (2011).
498. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w–3 (2011).
499. Id.
500. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w–3(b).
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can, therefore, be denied all Medicaid funds. 501 This would cripple states for which
Medicaid already represents the largest single expenditure in their state budgets. 502
For example, twenty-six percent of Florida‘s budget is devoted to Medicaid. 503 If
Florida lost federal funds, sixty percent of all state revenue would need to be
devoted to Medicaid to maintain pre-PPACA levels of care.504
This requirement is particularly problematic for states that have expanded
eligibility beyond the federally mandated level.505 These ―maintenance of effort‖
requirements will be in effect for adults through January of 2014, when the new
insurance exchanges are operational, and for children through September of
2019.506
PPACA seems to handcuff the states in terms of what they can do to address
budget deficits by reforming Medicaid.507 Because of the requirements of PPACA,
states have very little freedom in terms of cutting eligibility and benefits. 508 Many
states feel that this is an unfunded mandate designed to decrease the number of
uninsured individuals and increase the number of individuals who have their health
insurance through Medicaid. 509 In addition, as outlined in the previous section of
this article, some states feel that these Medicaid provisions are additional ―proof‘
that the Act is a violation of the 10th Amendment of the Constitution and that it
reduces the historical flexibility of the states with respect to regulation of health
insurance programs.510
The Supreme Court ultimately found that § 1396c, the provision that allows
the federal government to withdraw its Medicaid funding if a state does not
participate in the Medicaid expansion, is unconstitutional, and invalidated that
portion.511 The Supreme Court did not invalidate the whole act due to the
unconstitutionality of §1396c.512 In order to invalidate the entire act, the Court must
501. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w–3(a).
502. Will, supra note 481 (noting that Medicaid costs comprise the majority of state budgets and that
states are left with no choice but to participate in because it would leave millions of poor residents
without affordable care).
503. Will, supra note 481.
504. Will, supra note 481.
505. See supra text accompanying notes 481–87.
506. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2011).
507. Will, supra note 481.
508. Will, supra note 481.
509. See S. FIN. COMM. AND H. ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., 112TH CONG., REP. ON EXPANSION
IN THE NEW HEALTH LAW: COSTS TO THE STATES 2 (Joint Rep. 2011) (prepared by Sen. Orrin Hatch,
Ranking Member, S. Fin. Comm. and Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman, H. Energy & Commerce Comm.),
available
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/
analysis/20110301medicaid.pdf (noting that several states, including California and Texas, have issued
reports finding that PPACA‘s Medicaid mandates requires unprecedented spending that could bankrupt
states).
510. See supra text accompanying notes 488–506.
511. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012).
512. Id. at 2608.
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ask whether Congress would have wanted the rest of the Act to stand alone without
the unconstitutional provision.513 If yes, then the rest of the act must stay. 514 If not,
then the entire act must be invalidated.515 The Supreme Court stated that they ―are
confident that Congress would have wanted to preserve the rest of the Act. It is fair
to say that Congress assumed that every State would participate in the Medicaid
expansion, given that States had no real choice but to do so.‖ 516
The Supreme Court found § 1396c unconstitutional because it interpreted
Congress‘s Taxing and Spending power to be limited to creating incentives, not
exerting some form of inducement (to the point of coercion). 517 The Supreme Court
considered § 1396c to be coercive, stating: ―[i]n this case, the financial
―inducement‖ Congress has chosen is much more than ―relatively mild encouragement‖—it is a gun to the head.‖518 It looked to the fact that the entire existing
Medicaid funding would be at stake if States did not comply with the Medicaid
Expansion.519 The fear in the federalism context was that it would undermine
states‘ statuses as independent sovereigns over their people. 520
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court emphasized that although the withdrawal of
existing Medicaid funding to induce participation in the Medicaid Expansion was
unconstitutional, incentives in the form of offering funds that states could accept or
reject is still within Congress‘s Spending power. 521 This holding relied on the
notion that withdrawal of existing funds constitutes a penalty more than an
incentive.522
In the simplest terms, if prior to National Federation, Congress was free to
use a ―Carrot or a Stick approach‖ with its Taxing and Spending Power, the
Supreme Court‘s decision limited it to ―Carrots only.‖ 523 After National

513. Id. at 2607.
514. Id. (citing Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932)) (―Unless it is ‗evident‘ that the answer is no, we must leave the rest of the Act intact.‖).
515. Id.
516. Id. at 2608.
517. Id. at 2607 (noting that Congress can promote state participation in the new program by
offering additional funds to states who participate, but that Congress does not have the authority to
penalize states who chose not to participate by taking away existing Medicaid funding).
518. Id. at 2604.
519. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)).
520. Id. at 2602.
521. Id. at 2607.
522. Id.
523. Id. (remarking that Congress can offer states funding for new programs to expand access to
health care and place conditions on that funding but that Congress cannot take away states‘ existing
Medicaid funding as a penalty for not participating in the new program). ―Carrot or stick approaches‖
are methods used to induce cooperation either by providing position incentives, a ―carrot‖ approach,‖ or
by threatening harsher outcomes, a ―stick‖ approach. See Kathleen Segerson & Thomas Miceli,
Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?, J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 109, 110 (1998) (discussing carrot and stick approaches used in the context of
environmental regulation as a way to reduce pollution levels).
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Federation, Congress may no longer use withdrawal of existing funding to induce
state compliance with federal laws.524 Congress has one less enforcement tool in
their effort to effect national change. 525 Unanimous state participation in the
Medicaid expansion was a critical component of the complex PPACA regime to
provide universal health coverage for all Americans. 526 If a threat to withdraw all
existing funding in a program is considered too ―coercive,‖ and Congress is only
allowed to offer financial ―incentives,‖ is there anything Congress can do that will
both guarantee unanimous State participation in its program while having it be
constitutional? Is Congress therefore, by definition, unable to craft solutions that
require unanimous state participation? Or perhaps this is the main source of the
Supreme Court‘s concern for the integrity of federalism. 527 If Congress requires
unanimous state participation and enacts a law to guarantee it, is it possible that this
act is the definition of ―coercive‖? In the context of federalism, it would imply that
all solutions under a dual system of government must allow independent sovereigns
to reject that solution even if full unanimity is required for the solution to be
effective.528
VI. FEDERALISM ADDRESSED DIRECTLY
Much of the debate has revolved around the Commerce Clause and Taxing
Power issues.529 However, there has been a consistent presence of federalism issues
throughout the debate over the constitutionality of the mandate. 530 This paper
argues that differences over federalism are fundamental to the controversy over this
legislation and at the heart of the Supreme Court decision. 531 In fact, the Supreme
Court began its opinion with a broad overview of the importance of federalism,
addressing who should be in charge of policy for the citizens‘ health, as well as
whether this a state/local problem or a national problem and if the solution should
be state/local in nature or national in nature. 532 Although the health care coverage

524. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 2665 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (noting that Congress did not
contemplate that states would be able to refuse compliance with the Medicaid expansion provisions
when it enacted PPACA).
527. Id. at 2606 (refusing to establish a specific line after which Congressional ―persuasion gives
way to coercion‖).
528. See supra text accompanying notes 507–10.
529. See supra text accompanying notes 83–98.
530. See supra Part IV.D (examining the mandate‘s broad implications for federalism).
531. See supra Part V (discussing implementation issues surrounding PPACA‘s Medicaid provision
with a focus on federalism); see also infra notes 532–58 and accompanying text.
532. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577–80 (2012).(commenting on the
federalism concerns surrounding PPACA‘s mandate and Medicaid expansion provisions and whether
the federal government or individual states should dictate policy for citizen‘s healthcare).
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debate centers on Congress‘s Commerce and Taxing and Spending powers, these
are ultimately questions that will define the structure of our dual sovereignty. 533
Interestingly, there were some litigated cases where the federalism issue was
directly addressed.534 On the same day President Obama signed PPACA into law,
the Governor of Virginia filed the case of Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius; he
signed the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act (VHCFA) the following day.535 The
VHCFA states that ―[n]o resident of this Commonwealth. . .shall be required to
obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage.‖536 Traditionally,
individual state constitutions may give their citizens more rights than what the
federal constitution offers.537 State constitutions may not remove rights given in the
federal constitution.538 The VHCFA was phrased in such a way that it appeared to
confer its citizen more rights than what the federal constitution offered. 539
Therefore, the question was whether such a statute in direct conflict with a federal
law could be passed for the purpose of overriding federal law.540 The
Commonwealth of Virginia brought an action against the Secretary of the Health
and Human Services Department (HHS) challenging the constitutionality of the
individual mandate based on the presence of VHCFA. 541
The Fourth Circuit found that the Commonwealth of Virginia did not have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the individual mandate because
Virginia did not suffer ―injury in fact,‖ which is one of three elements to
demonstrate a ―case‖ or ―controversy.‖ 542 The Fourth Circuit stated:
the mere existence of a state law like the VHCFA does not license a
state to mount a judicial challenge to any federal statute with which
the state law assertedly conflicts. Rather, only when a federal law
interferes with a state‘s exercise of its sovereign ―power to create and
enforce a legal code‖ does it inflict on the state the requisite injuryin-fact.543

533. Id.
534. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing
Virginia‘s basis for standing to challenge the mandate on the grounds that the provision violated the
state‘s sovereign rights), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470098 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
535. Id. at 267.
536. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2–3430.1:1 (2010).
537. U.S. CONST. amend. X (―The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.‖).
538. Id.
539. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 270 (―[T]he VHCFA reflects no exercise of
‗sovereign power,‘ for Virginia lacks the sovereign authority to nullify federal law.‖).
540. Id. at 269.
541. Id. at 267.
542. Id. at 268, 272.
543. Id. at 269 (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)).
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The Fourth Circuit went on to say that the VHCFA does not regulate anything
and there is nothing to enforce.544 If Virginia is not exerting its sovereign power,
then there is no genuine conflict with the individual mandate and, therefore, there is
no injury-in-fact.545 The Fourth Circuit also pointed out that ―[t]he only apparent
function of the VHCFA is to declare Virginia‘s opposition to a federal insurance
mandate.‖546 Finally, a crucial policy argument against allowing the VHCFA to
confer standing to Virginia is that if it were allowed, a state could acquire standing
merely by enacting a statute that negated a federal law; it would, ―convert the
federal judiciary into a ‗forum‘ for the vindication of a state‘s ‗generalized
grievances about the conduct of government.‘‖ 547
This argument is reasonable to the extent that allowing a law like VHCFA to
conflict with PPACA would destroy the federalist structure of our government.548 If
VHCFA were allowed, states could simply pass a law that directly countered a
federal law just to bring a challenge to the court.549 The state‘s power to challenge
the federal government would be limitless. 550 However, such an argument does not
solve the major question of distinguishing what is truly national from what is truly
local.551 This is especially difficult for the health care market. 552 The health
insurance market is under state sovereignty due to the McCarren-Ferguson act,
which sequestered insurance regulation to the states. 553 However, the health
insurance market has become such a critical and integral component of the health
care market that the national crisis of the health care market will undoubtedly affect
the health insurance market.554 The problem is certainly national in nature but the

544. Id. at 271.
545. Id. at 268 (―Virginia must demonstrate that the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act
‗inva[des]‘ its ‗legally protected interest,‘ in a manner that is both ‗concrete and particularized‘ and
‗actual or imminent.‘‖) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
546. Id. at 270.
547. Id. at 271 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
548. Id. at 272 (citation omitted) (reasoning that adopting Virginia‘s standing theory would allow
states to challenge any issue in federal court regardless of how generalized or political the issue).
549. Id.
550. Id. at 272.
551. Id. at 272–73 (refraining from analyzing the underlying federalism concerns surrounding the
mandate because of the standing issue).
552. See supra Part III.B.2.
553. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2011) (exempting the business of
insurance regulation from federal regulation and keeping it solely within the state‘s powers to regulate).
554. Most Americans have health insurance, which is their primary means of acquiring their health
care services. See Les Christie, Number of People Without Health Insurance Climbs, CNNMONEY (Sept.
13, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/13/news/economy/census_bureau_health
_insurance/index.htm (implying that 83.7% of Americans are insured). Thus, a discussion of health care
services necessarily entails a discussion of health insurance. Id.
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solution involves the health insurance market, something traditionally within the
state‘s powers.555
VII. WHAT TO EXPECT IN THE FUTURE
Beyond the issues of mandates and the expanded role of the states through
Medicaid and SCHIP, the other critical implementation issue is the future of an
expanded regulatory role for the federal government. 556 In a move designed to
assuage concerns over the expanded role of the federal government, in February of
2011 President Obama told the National Governors Association that he would be
willing to allow states to obtain waivers from the controversial elements of the
health care legislation, including the individual mandate, as soon as the law went
into effect in 2014.557 This is an acceleration of previous waiver exemptions which
would have started in 2017.558 It is also a recognition of the underlying concerns
driving the health law legislation.559
Despite this olive branch, states will still have to apply for and be granted the
waivers, leaving them at the mercy of federal determination for the waiver and the
federal government requirements, which creates an expanded role for the federal
government.560 This expanded role will manifest itself in a number of ways: (a)
changes to the Medicare program and how it is financed; the Medicare tax rate will
increase by 0.9%—from 1.45% to 2.35%—on earnings over $200,000 for
individuals and $250,000 for families. In addition, a 3.8% Medicare tax would be
imposed on unearned income;561 (b) state health insurance exchanges will be
created;562 (c) the rules and procedures for operation will be regulated by the
federal government;563 (d) federal subsidies are provided to off-set the high costs of
health insurance and to, thereby, provide greater access to health insurance. These
subsidies vary according to household income to offset the cost of purchasing
health insurance for American citizens and legal residents who qualify; 564 (e)
regulation on the flexibility of private insurance companies to raise premiums and
requirements of insurance companies to pay a ―tax‖ to help finance the overall
555. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (exempting the business of insurance regulation from federal
regulation and keeping it solely within the state‘s powers to regulate).
556. See infra notes 560–70 and accompanying text.
557. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Kevin Sack, Obama Backs Easing State Health Law Mandates, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A1.
558. Id.
559. See id. (commenting that President Obama‘s announcement to allow states to opt out of the
mandate under certain conditions came amidst controversy surrounding the mandate in courts and prior
to the election).
560. See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2011) (detailing the process for obtaining a waiver).
561. See 26 U.S.C. § 1411 (2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (explaining the Medicare tax).
562. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w–3 (2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
563. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9008(f)(1), 10202 (c)(3)–
(4), §10322 (a)(4)(E), 124 Stat. 119, 868 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
564. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2011) (detailing the provisions for tax credits under PPACA).
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program. Insurance companies will be required to provide rebates to enrollees if
they spend less than eighty-five percent of premium dollars collected on health care
as opposed to administrative costs. 565 In addition, an annual fee of eight billion
dollars will be imposed on health insurance companies. 566 The annual fee on
insurance companies will increase to $11.3 billion.567 This is designed to help
finance the overall program;568 (f) strong regulation of pharmaceutical companies
to help insure that health care costs are affordable;569 and (g) a forty percent excise
tax is imposed on health care plans that cost more than $10,200 for individual
coverage and $27,500 for family coverage.570
Taken as a whole, PPACA is a landmark piece of legislation from the
perspective of the organization and financing of the American health insurance and
the health care delivery system. As outlined in this article, the implementation
strategies for this far-reaching legislation are complex and controversial.571 The
legal controversy centers around questions of the appropriate scope and breadth of
federal and state governments‘ roles in the design, delivery, and financing of health
care in the United States. The controversy is also focused on questions of
appropriate regulation of the insurance and pharmaceutical industries. The
legislation establishes health care as a ―legal right‘ for the vast majority of
Americans for the first time in United States history.572 It also recognizes that if we,
as a society, are to increase access to health insurance for an additional 31 million
Americans, then this can only be done (from a financial perspective) if everyone is
required to obtain health insurance.573 Moreover, the legislation is also a landmark
in increasing the role of the federal government in regulating health insurance and
thereby displacing the states as the primary regulators. 574
565. Large group plan insurers must provide an 85 percent rebate; small group or individual plan
insurers must provide an 80 percent rebate. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–18 (2011).
566. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
567. Id.
568. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–18 (2011) (describing the purpose of lowering the cost of health care
coverage).
569. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9008 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
570. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I (2011).
571. See supra Parts III–V.
572. See supra Parts III–V. It is a legal ―right‖ to the extent that all Americans can enforce their
rights and PPACA creates a society where all Americans must have health insurance. See Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
573. See DAVID AUERBACH ET AL., CONG. BUDGET OFF, WORKING PAPER NO. 2010–05, WILL
HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES INCREASE COVERAGE? SYNTHESIZING PERSPECTIVES FROM THE
LITERATURE IN HEALTH ECONOMICS, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 1 (2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/116xx/doc11634/working_paper_
2010-05-health_insurance_mandate.pdf (estimating that the amount of uninsured will drop by more than
30 million people).
574. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
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Following the 2012 election, based upon the political rancor, Congress will
likely take up questions related to the future of this legislation. 575 A House of
Representatives vote to repeal the legislation in Congress was symbolic but did not
have an operational impact.576 However, with an implementation schedule that
stretches over at least eight years, PPACA‘s controversial provisions will be
affected by the Supreme Court‘s decision regarding the individual Mandate and
Medicaid expansion, future congressional financing of the Act, federal and state
regulatory initiatives, and future national elections. 577
Inevitably, we may find any attempt by Congress to dispute PPACA to be a
pox on both their houses. Republicans have vowed to repeal parts of the legislation
deemed unpopular while saving the more popular parts, such as the insurance
reforms eliminating pre-existing condition clauses.578 Yet, these reforms cannot be
executed without the individual mandate. 579 To validate one provision without the
other is to invite the dissolution of the insurance market 580 and may be political
suicide.
Even in light of the Supreme Court decision, major implementation
controversies will continue and the ultimate outcome for our health insurance and
health care delivery system is uncertain. 581 The implementation challenges
associated with this legislation represent an important new chapter in the areas of
jurisprudence focused on federalism.
575. See President Obama Vows to Veto PPACA Repeal, AM. SOC. OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS (Jan. 7,
2011), http://www.asahq.org/For-Members/Advocacy/Washington-Alerts/President-Obama-Vows-toVeto-PPACA-Repeal.aspx (noting that President Obama vowed to veto any attempts to repeal PPACA);
Kathryn Mayer, Romney Slams PPACA, Vows to Repeal it, BENEFITSPRO (June 28, 2012),
http://www.benefitspro.com/2012/06/28/romney-slams-ppaca-vows-to-repeal-it (explaining former
presidential candidate Romney‘s stance on PPACA and his vow to repeal it if elected).
576. Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, H.R. 422, 112th Cong. (as passed by House of
Representatives, Jan. 19, 2011).
577. See supra Part III.
578. See, e.g., Jonathan Easley, Romney: Repeal Health Law, Keep Pre-existing Conditions Clause,
THE HILL (June 12, 2012, 10:02 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/politics-elections/232225romney-repeal-health-law-but-keep-some-pre-existing-coverage (noting Romney‘s statement that he
would repeal the law if elected, but would replace it with a law that included coverage for individuals
with pre-existing conditions).
579. See Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2613–14 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
580. Banning insurance companies from denying patients with preexisting conditions will increase
the cost of insurance since these patients are more costly to cover. This cost was meant to be offset by
the individual mandate. Without the individual mandate, the cost increase will remain yet the
mechanism meant to reduce this cost increase would be lost. See Robert Pear & Abby Goodnough, It
Will Be Tricky for Romney to Keep Best of Health Law While Repealing It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012,
at A11 (detailing Romney‘s proposal to get rid of the individual mandate while maintaining provisions
that would ensure insurance for those with pre-existing conditions).
581. See generally Ten Strategic Considerations of the Supreme Court Upholding PPACA,
MILLIMAN (June 29, 2012), http://insight.milliman.com/article.php?cntid=8113 (describing the impact
of the Supreme Court‘s decision to uphold PPACA and the uncertainty surrounding the legislation‘s
implementation).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Healthcare reform has been a source of great disagreement over the past few
decades causing a massive political divide between republicans and democrats.582
PPACA represents landmark legislation that sought to make universal healthcare a
reality.583 Proponents applauded it for its comprehensive and dynamic set up. 584
Opponents opposed it for its controversial components: the individual mandate and
Medicaid expansion.585 They brought their contention to federal courts and reached
the Supreme Court.586 The Supreme Court resolved a set of critical federalism
related issues pertaining to PPACA which the district and circuit courts differed on
and which we have summarized in this paper.587 Although the political divide over
healthcare reform centers on what healthcare ―should‖ look like from a policy
standpoint, the key implementation issues of PPACA, and consequently, any
healthcare reform in the future, will fundamentally have to be discussed in the
context of federalism.588

582. See supra Part II.
583. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (noting that Congress‘s goal in enacting
PPACA was to ensure that more Americans have health insurance).
584. See, e.g., Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, PPACA and Public Health: Creating a Framework to
Focus on Prevention and Wellness and Improve the Public’s Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366, 375
(2011) (noting that PPACA fills gaps in current federal health law by focusing on ―prevention and
wellness‖).
585. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
586. Id.
587. See supra Parts IV–VI.
588. See supra Parts V–VI.

